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Pennsylvania law will govern the contract. However, since 
plaintiff initiated the action here in Utah and has relied on Utah 
law throughout the proceedings, defendants contend that the 
plaintiff has waived its right to interpretation of the transaction 
under Pennsylvania law. 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken to the Utah Supreme Court by 
defendants Okudas and Conlins pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. Since the filing of the 
Notice of Appeal, the Utah Supreme Court has assigned this appeal 
to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. This appeal is further filed pursuant to Rules 3(a) 
and 4(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and pursuant to Rule 
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants appeal the summary judgment granted plaintiff 
by the trial court on the issues pertaining to liability. 
Defendants further appeal the trial court's order that the issues 
of damages and attorneys' fees be submitted by affidavit without 
trial or hearing. 
The defendants further appeal the issue of the propriety 
of the damages and attorneys1 fee awarded by the trial court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants were sued as guarantors of a transaction which 
is referred to as a Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement. Plaintiff 
a Pennsylvania corporation, provided automobile financing to 
M.C.O., Inc., a Utah corporation, doing business as American 
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collateral and is barred from seeking damages. 
Plaintiff obtained a summary judgment on the issue of 
liability. Subsequently, the trial court, by telephone conference, 
directed the parties to submit their "positions" on damages by 
affidavit and memorandum. Defendants objected to plaintiff's 
attorney's affidavit on attorneys' fees because of the failure to 
state the hourly rate at which the four (4) attorneys rendered 
services to plaintiff on this case. Defendants moved to strike the 
affidavit. The trial court denied defendants motion. The trial 
court, thereafter, awarded damages and attorney's fees without a 
hearing or trial. 
Defendants filed a cross-claim against Roy Mallory. The 
cross-claim was stayed because Roy Mallory filed for relief under 
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. He was later discharged from the 
obligations referred to in the cross-claim. 
Defendants also filed a third party complaint against 
Maureen Mallory. She has submitted a motion to bifurcate which 
awaits the trial court's ruling. 
The trial court entered judgment as a final judgment 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY WITHOUT 
RESOLVING THE FACTUAL ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 
TRANSACTION WAS A LEASE OR A SECURITY 
AGREEMENT? 
4 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Article I, Sec. 7, Constitution of Utah. 
2. Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
3. Section 70A-9-504 (3) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
4. Rule 4-501 (5), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
5. Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
6. Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This is an action for recovery of damages for breach of 
a contract entitled Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement which was 
prepared by plaintiff. (RA 13). Plaintiff seeks to recover 
damages pursuant to the provisions in the agreement. (RA 23, para. 
18.2). 
The defendants personally guaranteed performance of the 
agreement in the event the primary obligor, M.C.O., Inc. defaulted 
in its performance. (RA 111, 113). 
Defendants defend on the basis that the plaintiff should 
not be permitted to seek damages because the contract is a security 
agreement which is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement that the collateral 
be disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. 
Even if the contract is deemed a lease, the provisions 
of the document provide that the vehicles will be disposed of in 
6 
a commercially reasonable manner and defendants contend that the 
plaintiff failed to comply with this provision-
Defendants also assert that the plaintiff failed to 
mitigate its damages and is, therefore, estopped from seeking 
damages or should not be awarded the damages that are claimed. 
Finally, defendant contends that the plaintiff permitted 
the impairment of the collateral and is estopped from seeking 
damages against the defendants. (RA 379-390) 
Procedural issues relate to the propriety of the summary 
judgment granted on the issue of liability, to the trial court's 
order that issues pertaining to damages and attorneys' fees be 
submitted by affidavit and memorandum, and to the propriety of the 
award of attorneys' fee. 
Course of Proceedings: 
Plaintiff was granted summary judgment on the issue of 
liability. (RA 473, 474-477). Thereafter, the parties were 
directed by the trial court to simultaneously submit affidavits and 
memorandums on damages and attorneys' fees by a date certain. The 
trial court did not request nor obtain the defendants stipulation 
to proceed on affidavits and memorandums. Defendants objected to 
plaintiff's attorney's affidavit for attorneys' fees and moved to 
strike the affidavit because of its deficiency in failing to state 
the rate of the hourly charges used by four (4) attorneys. (RA 
531). Defendants' motion was denied. (RA 550, 551). 
Disposition: 
The trial court, thereafter, by telephone conference, 
7 
discussed his observations on the damage issues and rendered 
judgment awarding plaintiff damages and attorneys' fees- Defen-
dants appealed from that judgment. 
Relevant Facts: 
The Defendants Conlin and Okuda, together with Roy 
Mallory, initiated an auto rental agency under the name of M.C.O., 
Inc., doing business under the assumed name of American Interna-
tional Rent-A-Car. The American International name was used 
pursuant to a franchise or license agreement with the national 
company. 
The Plaintiff, LMV Leasing, Inc., provided financing for 
some of the vehicles which M.C.O., Inc., used as its fleet of 
rental automobiles. The document which the parties utilized to 
transact their business is entitled Preferred Vehicle Lease Agree-
ment. (RA 13). However, certain verbiage in the lease document 
suggests that the transactions may, in fact, have been intended as 
a security agreement, governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. For 
example, provisions for default reflect an express agreement by 
Plaintiff to dispose of the vehicles in a commercially reasonable 
manner which is the Utah Uniform Commercial Code requirement for 
disposal of collateral in a secured transaction. (RA 23, para. 19). 
Equally suggestive of a security agreement is verbiage to the 
effect that Defendants will be paid any excess from sales proceeds 
of the vehicle, if there is an excess. (RA 24, para. 19). 
The Defendants Conlin and Okuda and their wives signed 
guaranty agreements with Plaintiff to guaranty payment in the event 
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of M.C.O., Inc.'s default. (RA 111, 113). 
The guaranty agreement, also provided by Plaintiff, does 
not contain verbiage whereby the Defendants waive their right to 
notices of default nor does it contain verbiage by which the 
Defendants waive their defense of collateral impairment. 
In May, 1987, the principal shareholders and incorpora-
tors of M.C.O., Inc., became embroiled in internal conflict which 
resulted in a claimed "repossession" of the entire business of 
M.C.O., Inc., by Roy Mallory, an incorporator, officer, director 
and a creditor of M.C.O., Inc. A state court action ensued and 
eventually, in August of 1987, Roy W. Mallory, one of the Defen-
dants in this action, but not a party to this appeal, filed a 
petition in the Bankruptcy Court under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code to forestall the state court action. The Chapter 11 petition 
was eventually converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding by application 
of the U. S. Trustee. (RA 387-390). 
In December of 1987, before the vehicles were repossessed 
by Plaintiff, the Defendants Okuda and Conlin, together with the 
attorney for M CO., Inc. bankruptcy, Loren E. Weiss, conveyed to 
Plaintiff's attorney in Salt Lake City, Utah, a proposal from one 
Alma Demar Egbert who offered to either assume the M.C.O., Inc. 
agreement with LMV Leasing or purchase the vehicles in question, 
in place, at the American International premises because Egbert had 
obtained the rights to the American International franchise after 
M.C.O., Inc., defaulted in the franchise payments. Plaintiff did 
not respond to the offer nor did Plaintiff communicate any ac-
9 
knowledgment of the offer. (RA 283-288). 
Approximately March 11, 1988, the Plaintiff took posses-
sion of the vehicles it had provided financing for M.C.O., Inc., 
and the vehicles were placed with Nate Wade Subaru, a local new and 
used car dealer, to be sold for Plaintiff. (RA 328). 
The "Notice of Sale" states that cars will be sold after 
April 13, 1988, at the Nate Wade Subaru lot "and will be sold in 
the same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located at Nate 
Wade Subaru." (RA 328). 
All of the repossessed vehicles were sold between May 10 
and June 10, 1988. (RA 326, para. 11). 
Plaintiff initiated this action in April of 1988, seeking 
damages for breach of the lease agreement. Defendants Okudas and 
Conlins were named as defendants because of their personal guaran-
tees . 
Defendants Okudas and Conlins claimed, as part of their 
defense, that Plaintiff permitted the impairment of the collateral 
after default, that Plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages, and 
further that the disposal of the vehicles was not done in a commer-
cially reasonable manner and, therefore, Plaintiff should not be 
permitted to recover for the alleged damages. (RA 379). 
In August, 1988, Plaintiff moved for Summary Judgment on 
the issues of liability and damages. (RA 242). Defendants Okudas 
and Conlins resisted on the basis that material issues of fact 
remained to be litigated as to Plaintiff's failure to mitigate 
damages, as to whether the transaction was a lease or a security 
10 
agreement subject to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, as to the 
Plaintiff's failure to dispose of the vehicles in a commercially 
reasonable manner, and as to the issue of damages and mitigation 
of damages. (RA 278, 396). The trial court, after oral argument 
on the 13th day of October, 1988, denied Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (RA 402). 
The Defendants filed cross-claims and third party com-
plaints against Roy W. Mallory and Maureen Mallory. Roy W. Mallory 
filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and, therefore, the Plaintiff's claim and Defendants Okuda and 
Conlin's cross-claim against Roy W. Mallory were stayed. (RA 412) . 
Maureen Mallory moved for bifurcation of the third party 
action and awaits the trial court's decision on bifurcation. 
On the 13th day of February, 1989, Plaintiff moved for 
Summary Judgment as to liability only. (RA 448). This subsequent 
motion was submitted pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of Edward T. 
McCracken dated August 4, 1988, which had been submitted with 
Plaintiff's earlier motion for summary judgment. (RA 250, 423). 
The McCracken affidavits do not state whether the ve-
hicles were advertised for sale as the other used cars of Nate Wade 
Subaru are advertised; it does not state who was invited to bid; 
it does not state whether the cars were sold to the highest bidder; 
it does not state that the sales prices were within acceptable 
range of similar vehicles sold in Salt Lake City. (Compare RA 250, 
323, 423) . The McCracken affidavits do not rebut the Affidavit of 
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Alma Demar Egbert to the effect that an offer was made in December 
of 1987 to assume the auto leases or to purchase the vehicles, in 
place, at the American International business premises since Egbert 
had assumed the American International franchise. {RA 283). No 
other opposing affidavits were submitted to rebut Egbert's af-
fidavit . 
The Affidavit of Ivar Blackner, who was acting in behalf 
of Defendants, to the effect that he was denied the right on three 
(3) separate occasions to inspect the vehicles in anticipation of 
submitting bids remains unopposed. (RA 393 Affidavit of Blackner). 
Loren E. Weiss, attorney for M.C.O., Inc., in its bank-
ruptcy proceedings, submitted an affidavit stating he personally 
communicated to plaintiff's attorney, Wes Harris of Watkiss & 
Campbell, an offer by Egbert to purchase or lease, in place, all 
of the vehicles plaintiff provided to M.C.O., Inc. Mr. Weiss 
further states that neither he nor M.C.O., Inc., received a res-
ponse to that offer. (RA 286-288). 
Affidavit of Conlin dated the 20th day of February, 1989, 
to the effect that he had authority to buy the vehicles for a 
vehicle dealer in Las Vegas, Nevada, and would have done so, except 
for the problem encountered by Blackner is unopposed. (RA 467 
Affidavit of Conlin). 
The Affidavit of David Wilden to the effect that Val J. 
Conlin had authority to purchase the repossessed vehicles for 
resale in Las Vegas, Nevada, is unopposed. (RA 470 Affidavit of 
Wilden). 
12 
Notwithstanding the Affidavits of Conlin, Wilden, Egbert, 
Blackner, and Weiss, the trial court granted plaintiff's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability on the basis 
that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact regarding 
liability. Included in this judgment of liability is a statement 
that the remaining issue on damages would be determined by Affi-
davits or hearing. (RA 474-476 Judgment on Liability). 
Defendants were notified by telephone on March 1, 1989, 
that the trial court had granted plaintiff's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Defendants subsequently received a copy of the 
unsigned Final Judgment of Liability on March 6, 1989. 
On March 13, 1989, Brad Willis, Judge Brian's Clerk, 
telephoned and arranged for a telephone conference with counsel for 
plaintiff and defendants. On March 14, 1989, Judge Brian by 
telephone conference stated the issue of damages would be deter-
mined by Affidavits and Memorandums to be submitted by plaintiff 
and defendants simultaneously. The parties were given two (2) 
weeks to file Affidavits and Memorandum of damages. 
At th'e direction of the trial court, defendants Okudas 
and Conlins submitted the second Affidavit of Val J. Conlin which 
was directed primarily at the issue of damages. (RA 488 Affidavit 
of Conlin dated March 18, 1989). However, by Memorandum, defen-
dants contended that the plaintiff may have avoided all damages if 
plaintiff had diligently pursued the Egbert offer to assume or 
purchase the vehicles while the vehicles were still at the American 
International lot, and before repossession had taken place. 
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Consequently, the defendants contended that, depending upon the 
facts proven in this case, plaintiff may have been made whole on 
the transaction with defendants had plaintiff pursued the Egbert 
offer to purchase or assume the lease. (RA 492-498 Defendants1 
Memorandum dated March 31, 1989). 
On April 25, 1989, Brad Willis again arranged for a 
telephone conference with the trial court, counsel for Plaintiff, 
and counsel for Defendants. On April 26, 1989, Judge Brian stated, 
by telephone conference, his decision on the issue of damages. 
The Final Judgment on liability and damages was received 
by counsel for defendants Conlins and Okudas on May 1, 1989, 
although the judgment was dated May 4, 1989. (RA 544 Final Judg-
ment dated May 4, 1989). 
As part of the judgment, plaintiff was awarded attorneys1 
fees of $13,500.00 based on an Affidavit of Brett F. Wood dated 
April 21, 1989. (RA 551). The Affidavit, paragraph 10, lists the 
hours expended by the respective attorneys but does not state what 
rate was charged by each of the four (4) attorneys. (RA 526-530). 
Defendants Okuda and Conlin objected to the adequacy of 
the Affidavit for Attorney's Fees and moved to strike the Affidavit 
for failure to comply with Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, pertaining to the hourly rate charged and the 
reasonableness of that rate. (RA 531)• 
The trial court ruled that the Affidavit was adequate and 
awarded the sum of $13,500.00 as attorney's fees. (RA 544-552 
Final Judgment dated May 4, 1989). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
on liability because there was an unresolved issue of fact as to 
whether the transaction sued upon was a lease or a security agree-
ment. 
2. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
because there remained an unresolved issue of fact as the whether 
the vehicles were disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner 
as required by Section 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
3. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
because there remained an unresolved issue of fact on the commer-
cially reasonable disposition of the vehicles as required by the 
terms of the agreements. 
4. The trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment because there remained an unresolved issue of fact as to 
whether plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages. If plaintiff 
failed to mitigate its damages; 
a) was plaintiff entitled to recover any damages? 
b) if plaintiff was entitled to recover some damages, 
what amount of damages was plaintiff entitled to? 
5. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
because there remained an unresolved issue of fact as to the 
impairment of the collateral by plaintiff. 
6. The trial court erred in directing the parties to 
submit the issues of damages and attorneys' fees on affidavit 
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without trial or hearing because it deprives defendants of their 
right to trial on those issues. Furthermore, the trial court's 
order that the affidavit and memorandum on damages be submitted 
simultaneously denies defendants their right to due process because 
it places upon defendants, a burden of disproving damages before 
plaintiff carries its burden to prove damages and attorneys1 fees. 
7. The trial court erred in denying defendants' motion 
to strike plaintiff's affidavit of attorneys' fees because the 
affidavit did not state the hourly rate of the attorneys participa-
ting in behalf of plaintiff as required by Rule 4-505(1) , Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration. Defendants contend that without 
disclosure of the hourly rate at which attorneys' fees are sought 
or awarded, defendants are unable to challenge the reasonableness 
of the fees requested* 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY BECAUSE THERE 
REMAINED AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE 
TRANSACTION SUED UPON WAS A LEASE AGREEMENT OR 
A SECURITY AGREEMENT. 
Plaintiff initiated this action seeking to recover 
damages for breach of the agreement entitled, "Preferred Vehicle 
Lease Agreement." Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, plaintiff 
sought damages which represented the full-term lease price, less 
the sales proceeds of the repossessed vehicles, less interest for 
the remaining term of the lease computed at 6 percent. The actual 
interest rate on the transaction was at two percent over prime 
computed monthly as of the 15th day of each month. 
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As part of defendants1 second amended answer, defendants 
alleged that the transaction was a sales agreement rather than a 
lease agreement and, therefore, provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code were applicable to this transaction; more specifi-
cally, provisions requiring the commercially reasonable disposition 
or sale of the collateral. (RA 371) 
The Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement, which was provided 
by the plaintiff, contains provisions and verbiage that suggests 
the transaction was intended as an installment sales contract or 
a security agreement rather than a lease. 
For example, the document contains verbiage such as "Pur-
chase Orders," (RA 14, para. 1.14) and contains a disclaimer as to 
"merchantability of the vehicle." (RA 16, para. 5). The document 
provides for acceleration in the event of default and prescribes 
a commercially reasonable sale of the vehicles. (RA 22, para. 18, 
RA 23, para. 19) 
The document suggests that the purchaser may gain some 
"equity" in the vehicles. The document provides that defendants 
will be paid any surplus or excess after the sale of the vehicles 
if a surplus is realized after termination by expiration or default 
of the agreement. (RA 23-24, para. 19). Schedule A to the agree-
ment further suggests that the parties intended a sales-security 
agreement rather than a lease agreement. (RA 237). Paragraph 1 
appears to provide plaintiff a sales commission of $75.00 per 
vehicle M.C.O. obtains through the plaintiff. Paragraph 2 outlines 
what appears to be a commission of $75.00 per vehicle on the resale 
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of the vehicles upon termination or expiration of the individual 
agreements. The wording is to the effect that plaintiff will 
receive $75.00 for each vehicle "sold by LMV on behalf of M.C.O., 
Inc., DBA/American International Car Rental." (Emphasis added) (RA 
237, para. 2) 
The document further provides for sales margin in favor 
of plaintiff of $100.00 over invoice or 2% over procurement cost 
of all vehicles acquired by the defendants. (RA 28, para 6). 
As part of this agreement, defendants were obligated to 
pay for insurance, service, repair, license, taxes and were 
responsible for any risk of loss. (RA 13-31). A review of the 
entire transaction leads to the obvious conclusion that plaintiff 
does not have cars to lease but is merely a financier who makes 
loans for acquisition of vehicles by commercial entities. 
In Colonial Leasing Company of New England, Inc. v. 
Larsen Brothers Construction Co. , 731 P.2d 483 (Utah, 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court outlined the factors which must be considered 
when determination is required on whether a document is a lease or 
a security agreement which may afford the protection of Article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Justice Stewart, writing for the 
Court stated: 
"Numerous factors bear on determining 
whether the terms of an agreement show that it 
was meant to be a lease or a security agree-
ment. Among others, those factors are whether 
(1) the lessor is a financier, (2) the lessee 
is required to insure the goods in favor of the 
lessor, (3) the lessee bears the risk of loss 
or damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the taxes, 
repairs, maintenance, (5) the agreement 
establishes default provisions governing 
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acceleration and resale, (6) a substantial non-
refundable deposit is required, (7) the goods 
are to be selected from a third party by the 
lessee, (8) the rental payments were equivalent 
to the costs of the goods plus interest, (9) 
the lessor lacks facilities to store or retake 
the goods, (10) the lease may be discounted 
with a bank, (11) the warranties usually found 
in leases are omitted, and (12) the goods or 
fixtures are impractical to remove*" 
In this case most of the factors enumerated in Colonial 
are contained in the agreement. These provisions, considered with 
other factors outlined earlier, such as the provision that the 
plaintiff would receive $75.00 for each vehicle plaintiff sold Min 
behalf of M.C.O., Inc.," strongly suggests that the transaction in 
question was intended to be a security agreement rather than a 
lease. 
In reversing the summary judgment granted to the plain-
tiff in Colonial, Justice Stewart states: 
" In sum, whether a lease was intended as 
a security for a sale is a question to be 
determine/! on the facts of each case, as is the 
issue of whether the nature of the document 
raises questions of fact that preclude summary 
judgment." (Id) 
Defendants contend that the document in question contains 
sufficient indications which suggest that the document was a sales 
and security agreement and not a lease. The trial court, there-
fore, erred in not permitting defendants the opportunity to 
litigate that issue of fact. 
POINT II : THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE REMAINED AN 
UNRESOLVED FACTUAL ISSUE AS TO WHETHER THE 
VEHICLES WERE DISPOSED OF IN A COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE MANNER. 
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If the document is deemed to be a sale and security 
agreement, plaintiffs would have been obliged to carry the burden 
of proof as to whether the vehicles were disposed of in a commer-
cially reasonable manner. Section 70A-9-504(3), Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended. This provision has been held to require 
the secured party to prove that every aspect of the sale of the 
vehicles was commercially reasonable. Haggis Management, Inc. v. 
Turtle Management, Inc., 745 P.2d 442 (Utah, 1985). Chief Justice 
Hall, speaking for the Court stated: 
"Whether proper notice of the disposition 
was sent to the debtor is but one factor to be 
considered in determining whether the disposi-
tion was commercially reasonable under section 
9-504(3). In addition, we must consider 
whether 'every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and 
terms' was commercially reasonable. Of prime 
importance, are the secured party's attempts 
to obtain a fair price for the collateral by 
advertising the collateral or otherwise notify-
ing potential buyers that the collateral is for 
sale. Haggis asserts that before the sale to 
Chianti, potential buyers were solicited. The 
record shows there was no advertisement or 
public notice of sale and that, at most, only 
a few potential buyers were contacted and no 
firm bids were received before the sale to 
Chianti. Such minimal efforts are insufficient 
as a matter of law to establish that the 
collateral was sold in a commercially reason-
able manner." (Emphasis added) 
"Generally, a secured party who fails to 
dispose of collateral in a commercially 
reasonable manner is barred from recovering a 
deficiency judgment. Inasmuch as the disposi-
tion of the collateral in this case was not 
commercially reasonable, plaintiff is barred 
from recovering a deficiency judgment against 
the guarantors." (Emphasis added) 
In the instant case, the plaintiff repossessed the 
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vehicles and placed them with Nate Wade Subaru, a new and used car 
dealer in Salt Lake City, Utah. No evidence was provided by 
plaintiff to indicate what advertising was done before the sale of 
the vehicles nor did plaintiff indicate who was permitted to bid 
on or purchase the repossessed vehicles. The notice of sale 
provides that the vehicles will be sold by Nate Wade Subaru "in 
the same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located at Nate 
Wade Subaru." (RA 328) 
In Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc. v. Glaubensklee, 649 P.2d 
28 (Utah, 1982) , the Utah Supreme Court ruled that a used car 
dealer should at least advertise the sale of a repossessed vehicle 
in a newspaper of general circulation for a reasonable period of 
time. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court stated: 
" Although there may be exceptions, (cita-
tion omitted) we think that in general an 
automobile dealer should advertise a repos-
sessed car in a newspaper of general circula-
tion for a reasonable period of time and in a 
manjier consistent with the manner by which 
other used cars are advertised." 
Since the plaintiff in this case elected to place the 
cars at Nate Wade Subaru and sell them "in the same manner and 
fashion as other used vehicles at Nate Wade Subaru," plaintiff was 
obligated to advertise the sale of the vehicles in a newspaper of 
general circulation for a reasonable period of time. 
The defendants do not dispute the claim that notification 
of the sale was sent by plaintiff. However, defendants contend 
that after notice was received, they sent one Ivar Blackner to 
inspect the vehicles in anticipation of submitting bids to purchase 
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the vehicles. Defendants contend that three (3) separate attempts 
were made by Blackner to inspect the vehicles but he was not 
permitted to inspect the vehicles in anticipation of bidding on 
them. Defendants also contend that they were financially capable 
of purchasing the vehicles had they been afforded the opportunity 
to do so. (RA 393, 467, 470, 488, Affidavits of Blackner, Conlin, 
Wilden.) 
The Utah Supreme Court, in K.J. Scharf v. BMG Corpora-
tion, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah, 1985), held: 
"The purpose of the notice requirement is 
for the protection of the debtor, by permitting 
him to bid at the sale, or arrange for inter-
ested parties to bid, and to otherwise assure 
that the sale is conducted in a commercially 
reasonable manner" 
Since the defendants, in this case, were prevented from 
bidding on the vehicles, the Court should determine, as matter of 
law, that the sale was not commercially reasonable and that 
plaintiff, is therefore, not entitled to a deficiency judgment, 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE REMAINED AN 
UNRESOLVED QUESTION OF FACT AS TO WHETHER THE 
VEHICLES WERE DISPOSED OF IN A COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE MANNER AS REQUIRED BY THE AGREEMENT. 
Even if defendants were to concede, for the purpose of 
this argument, that the transaction in question was a lease rather 
than a security agreement, the document provides that the repos-
sessed vehicles will be sold in a commercially reasonable manner. 
The document does not define what commercially reasonable disposi-
tion means. Since the phrase is apparently adopted from the 
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Uniform Commercial Code, the logical assumption is that the phrase 
requires the same tests of commercial reasonableness that is 
required by the Uniform Commercial Code. The arguments and 
citations on the issue of the commercially reasonable disposition 
of the collateral, whether required by the Uniform Commercial Code 
or by agreement are identical. Defendants adopt the arguments and 
citations advanced under the previous heading. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE REMAINED AN 
ISSUE OF FACT AS TO WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS 
ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING RECOVERY BECAUSE OF 
IMPAIRMENT OF THE COLLATERAL. 
As part of defendants1 second amended complaint, defen-
dants alleged that the plaintiff violated its fiduciary duty to 
defendants and also permitted the impairment of the collateral and, 
therefore, should be estopped from seeking recovery from defen-
dants. (RA 371) . 
As stated earlier in this brief, the plaintiff ignored 
the offer of Alma Dl Egbert and permitted Roy Mallory and Alma D. 
Egbert to use the vehicles for rentals from at least, December, 
1987, to March of 1988, before plaintiff elected to repossess the 
vehicles. (RA 278-282). Furthermore, after repossessing the cars, 
the plaintiff failed to advertise the vehicles for sale and refused 
to permit defendants to inspect the vehicles so defendants could 
intelligently bid on the vehicles. 
In Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Rite Way Concrete 
Forming, Inc., 742 P.2d 105 (Utah, 1987), defendants, guarantors, 
were sued by the bank because the debtor defaulted in its obliga-
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tion. The defendants informed the bank where the collateral was 
located but the bank did not attempt to recover the collateral and, 
instead, elected to release its interest to the collateral to 
another claimant. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the summary 
judgment granted by the trial court to the bank. Judge Garff, 
speaking for the court stated: 
"However, a guarantor, upon payment of 
the guaranteed obligation, has a right of 
subrogation to any collateral pledged as 
security. (Citations omitted) This is true 
even of an absolute guarantor. This right to 
subrogation is a 'creature of equity' whose 
'purpose is the prevention of injustice and is 
the mode which equity adopts to compel the 
ultimate payment of a debt by one who in 
justice, equity, and good conscience ought to 
pay it.' (Citations omitted.) The rationale 
is that the creditor, having elected to proceed 
against security for payment of the debt, is 
deemed to be in a trustee relationship with the 
guarantor. The creditor may liquidate the 
security and apply the proceeds to the obliga-
tion, or he may forego recourse to the security 
and proceed against the guarantor of payment, 
provided he does not subvert the guarantor's 
subrogation rights against collateral pledged 
by the principal obligor. If he breaches that 
trust duty by destroying, losing, or otherwise 
improvidently dissipating the collateral, he 
may not hold the guarantor wholly liable 
because the guarantor would have been sub-
rogated to the creditor's right of resort to 
that security. (Citation omitted) Thus, where 
a creditor's actions impair the value of the 
collateral in its possession which secures an 
obligation guaranteed by a guarantor, either 
absolute or conditional, the guarantor will be 
discharged from his obligation to the extent 
of the impairment." 
In the instant case, the collateral was permitted to 
remain in the possession of strangers to this transaction and in 
use as rentals long after the plaintiff was entitled to possession. 
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Furthermore, once plaintiff took possession, it did not permit 
defendants the opportunity to bid on the vehicles nor did the 
plaintiff advertise the sale of the vehicles. Under these cir-
cumstances, defendants contend that there is, at least, an issue 
of fact as to whether the plaintiff violated defendants'/guaran-
tors ' right to subrogation to the collateral by denying defendants 
the right to bid on and purchase the collateral. 
Additionally, there is the question of whether plaintiff 
permitted the impairment of the collateral by permitting persons, 
namely Alma D. Egbert and company, not directly accountable to 
plaintiff, to defendants or to the primary obligor, M.C.O., Inc., 
to use the vehicles as rentals long after plaintiff was entitled 
to possession of the vehicles and entitled to sell the collateral 
without permitting defendants to bid on or purchase the vehicles* 
Defendants assert that they should be relieved of their 
obligation as a matter of law because plaintiff permitted the 
impairment of the collateral and plaintiff deprived defendants 
their right of subrogation to the collateral. 
POINT V: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE REMAINED ISSUES 
OF FACTS AS TO DAMAGES AND MITIGATION OF 
DAMAGES. 
Shortly after receiving notification and prior to the 
sale of the repossessed vehicles, the defendants requested Ivar 
Blackner, a person engaged in the automobile sales business, to 
inspect the repossessed vehicles which were being stored at Nate 
Wade Subaru in Salt Lake City, Utah. By affidavit, Mr. Blackner 
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states he attempted on three (3) separate occasions to inspect the 
vehicles but was not permitted to see the vehicles. (RA 393) 
Defendant Conlin submitted affidavits stating that he, 
as manager of a used car division of an automobile leasing and 
sales company in Las Vegas, Nevada, would have purchased the 
vehicles had the plaintiff permitted the inspection of the ve-
hicles. (RA 468) The owner of the business in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
Mr. Wilden, submitted an affidavit confirming that Defendant Conlin 
had authority to purchase the vehicles for resale in Las Vegas. 
(RA 470-471). 
Prior to the repossession of the vehicles by plaintiff, 
counsel for plaintiff in Salt Lake City was contacted by attorney 
Loren Weiss and informed that one Alma D. Egbert was interested in 
either assuming the defendants' lease or in purchasing the vehicles 
from plaintiff. This information was conveyed by Weiss to counsel 
for the plaintiff by December of 1987, approximately four (4) 
months before the plaintiff's repossessed the vehicles. (RA 286-
288) . 
Alma D. Egbert submitted an affidavit that he had earlier 
submitted an offer to the officers of plaintiff corporation to 
either assume the lease or purchase the vehicles in place at the 
M.C.O., Inc., business location. This offer was made because Mr. 
Egbert had procured the American International Rent-A-Car franchise 
which M.C.O., Inc., had lost because of default in payments. (RA 
283-285). 
Plaintiff's did not respond to either communications. 
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However, plaintiff offers, after the fact, for summary judgment 
purposes, a copy of a petition in bankruptcy for Alma D. Egbert 
which was filed in August of 1987. (RA 518), Yet Mr. Weiss states 
in his affidavit that Mr. Egbert, in December of 1987 assumed or 
satisfied several substantial debts that the defendants and MCO 
Inc., had incurred. 
If the evidence at trial were to show that Mr. Egbert 
would have been able to assume the lease or purchase the vehicles 
for the remaining balance of defendants' contract, it would be 
possible that plaintiff would not have been entitled to any damages 
because of its failure to mitigate its damages. The degree of any 
of plaintiff's loss would have been dependant upon the evidence at 
trial. 
If the evidence at trial proved that plaintiff failed to 
mitigate its damages but was, nevertheless, entitled to some 
damages, the factual issue remained as to the amount of damages 
plaintiff suffered., 
In Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 
P.2d 62, (Utah, 1981), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the 
defendant was barred from recovering from a breach of an agreement 
where he failed to actively pursue other alternatives to mitigate 
his losses. In that case, Justice Hall, writing for the majority 
stated: 
"Where a contractual agreement has been 
breached by a party thereto, the aggrieved 
party is entitled to those damages that will 
put him in as good a position as he would have 
been had the other party performed pursuant to 
the agreement. A corollary to this rule is 
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that the aggrieved party may not, either by 
action or inaction, aggravate the injury 
occasioned by the breach, but has a duty 
actively to mitigate his damages..." 
Where an alternative financing 
source is available, other damages due to the 
breach are generally avoidable, and hence not 
compensable." 
In the instant case, defendant contends that had plain-
tiff pursued the offer of Alma D. Egbert, or had plaintiff's agent, 
Nate Wade Subaru, not prevented defendants from inspecting and 
subsequently purchasing the vehicles, plaintiff may not have suf-
fered a loss and, in any event, plaintiff would not have suffered 
the loss it claims after the sale of the vehicles. 
Since plaintiff failed to take any action to mitigate its 
losses, plaintiff should be barred, as a matter of law, from 
recovering damages. 
POINT VI: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING 
THE PARTIES TO SUBMIT THE ISSUES OF DAMAGES AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON AFFIDAVITS TO BE FILED 
SIMULTANEOUSLY. 
It is axiomatic in the field of law that the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving his damages or any other claim the 
plaintiff advances. Only then is it incumbent upon the defendant 
to present its evidence to counter that of the plaintiff. 
In the instant case, the trial court directed the 
defendant to submit its affidavit and memorandum on damages and 
attorneys' fees simultaneously with that of the plaintiff. In 
effect, the court placed a burden upon the defendant to disprove 
plaintiff's damages at the same time plaintiff was to submit it's 
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proof of damages. As the circumstances developed, plaintiff 
submitted its affidavits on damages approximately three (3) weeks 
after the trial court's deadline and after the defendant submitted 
their affidavits and memorandum of damages. (Compare filing dates 
RA 492 and RA 502). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has ruled that the improper 
shifting of the burden of proof constitutes a violation of defen-
dant's right to due process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
In State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah, 1988), the 
trial court found the defendant guilty of possession and consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages within the State of Utah although the 
prosecution presented no evidence that the violation occurred in 
Utah. The trial court justified its decision by stating the 
defendant did not present evidence to show he did not consume or 
possess the alcoholic beverages in Utah. The Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed the conviction. Judge Orme, speaking for the court 
stated: 
"Without regard to the location of the 
defendant's arrest, we find the presumption or 
assumption used by the court unconstitutional 
in that it shifted the burden of proof on the 
fact of jurisdiction to defendant in violation 
of the due process clause of Article 1, Section 
7 of the Utah Constitution...." 
Defendants contend that the trial court, in this case, 
shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove damages simul-
taneous to the plaintiff's proof of damages and the rationale in 
State v. Sorenson is controlling, albeit, this is a civil case and 
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the issues are damages and attorneys1 fees rather than jurisdiction 
of a criminal offense. 
Defendants further assert that the trial court erred in 
depriving defendants their right to trial on the issues of damages 
and attorneys' fees. 
After summary judgment on liability was rendered by the 
trial court, the court announced, by telephone conference, that the 
issues of damages and attorneys' fees would be submitted by 
affidavits and memorandum. The parties were given a deadline to 
simultaneously submit their affidavits and memorandum. The 
defendants did not agree or stipulate to this procedure nor were 
the parties asked if this procedure was acceptable. Subsequently, 
the trial court rendered judgment on damages and attorneys' fees 
without trial or hearing. 
In Christensen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314, the 
Utah Supreme Court outlined some of the factors to be considered 
to determine whether a person was provided due process under 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. One of the factors 
enumerated is a "fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine and 
cross-examine witnesses." 
The circumstances of this case did not justify the 
determination of damages without a trial or hearing. 
POINT VII: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT FOR 
ATTORNEYS' FEES DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 4-505(1), UTAH CODE OF 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AND CASE LAW. 
Plaintiff submitted the affidavit of one of its attor-
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neys, Brett F. Wood, in support of plaintiff's request for attor-
neys1 fees. (RA 526). The affidavit reflects the cumulative hours 
spent by each attorney on the case and also reflects the hours 
spent by clerks and "other firm personnel." While the hourly 
rates of the non-attorneys are shown, the rates charged by the four 
(4) attorneys are not shown. 
Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
appears unclear as to whether the hourly rate charged by attorneys 
must be stated in the affidavit. However, when read in conjunction 
with recent decisions, the intent of the Rule is clear. Section 
1 of the Rule reads: 
"Affidavits in support of an award of 
attorneys' fees must set forth specifically 
the legal basis for the award, the nature of 
the work performed by the attorney, the number 
of hours spent to prosecute the claim to 
judgment, or the time spent in pursuing the 
matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees 
are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of 
the fees for comparable legal services. The 
affidavit must also separately state the hours 
by persons other than attorneys, for time 
spent, work completed and hourly rate billed." 
The Utah courts have consistently required evidence of 
the reasonableness of the fees sought. In Talley v. Talley, 739 
P.2d 83 (Utah, 1987), the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's denial of attorney's fees because the attorney failed to 
present evidence as to the reasonableness of the fees requested. 
Judge Bench stated: 
"Conspicuously absent is any evidence 
'regarding the necessity of the number of hours 
dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate 
charged in light of the difficulty of the case 
and the result accomplished, and the rates 
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commonly charged for divorce actions in the 
community." (Emphasis added) 
The Talley decision on attorneys' fees was reaffirmed in 
Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah, 1989). 
Although the trial court in this case ruled that the 
affidavit for attorneys' fees was sufficient to justify the award, 
it is obviously impossible for the opposition to challenge the 
reasonableness of the fees requested unless the rates charged by 
each attorney is disclosed. Without that disclosure, there would 
be a failure of proof as to the reasonableness since no rate is 
stated. Under these circumstances, one is bound to inquire as to 
how he is to prove or challenge the reasonableness of the rate 
charged if the rate is not disclosed. 
The trial court obviously erred in awarding attorneys' 
fees and the attorneys' fees should be denied as a matter of law 
because of the deficiency of Mr. Wood's affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, the trial court, in effect, granted 
summary judgment on liability, damages and attorneys' fees, 
notwithstanding the factual issues raised on these matters. 
The trial court was obligated to view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the defendants which is the same standard 
used by the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
Rule 4-501(5), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, 
states that all material facts set forth in movant's statement 
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which remain uncontroverted are deemed to be true for the purpose 
of summary judgment. Although the rule is silent as to statements 
of opposing party which remain uncontroverted, a logical corollary 
of that rule is that uncontroverted statements of the defending 
party, particularly those contained in affidavits, should also be 
deemed to be true. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of fact. 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case, there were several issues of facts 
pertaining to the nature of the agreement, to the reasonableness 
of the sale of the vehicles, to the mitigation of or failure to 
mitigate damages, and to the reasonableness of the attorneys1 fees 
awarded. 
Defendants submit that the Utah Court of Appeals should 
rule, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff did not dispose of the 
vehicles in a commercially reasonable manner and is, therefore, not 
entitled to a deficiency judgment. 
Defendants further submit that the plaintiff failed to 
actively pursue a possible alternate contract to mitigate its 
damages and plaintiff should, therefore, be denied recovery as a 
matter of law. 
Plaintiff should be denied recovery as a matter of law 
for impairing the collateral to which the defendants had a right 
of subrogation. 
Finally, plaintiff should also be denied attorneys' fees 
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as a matter of law for failing to state the rates at which plain-
tiffs attorneys rendered their services to plaintiff-
In the alternative, the judgment should be reversed and 
the case remanded to the District Court for trial on all issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A/ 
Kenneth M. Hisatake 
/V 
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Blake D. Miller, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
50 West Broadway, <. ;. h Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Ma1 : • • 
/ 1
 *'ia ""^' day or V ,Q' t/e-a \fre I 1989 . 
f\&* < * • * T •* /f S, *— 
0 2 -2LMV.aOA 
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ADDENDUM 
E x h i b :i t A A r t i c l e I , ' - > >n>> i . ».uu i <JJ I u L ^ L a 11 
Exi : : S e c . 70A-9 LK--J * r ' t a h Code A n n o t a t e d , 
air ond ' «] 
Exi. :.-. * K. -i S0PS < 1 > . Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
RA 13 Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement 
R A " ! ! ' ! • • • • 
: . G l i a l JLI:\ V D K U d ' l 
RA 3;;8 Notice of Sale 
A R r; 1, §' i co.; i 
Gun control laws, validity an '. v...i.->" i ••» 
tion of, 28 A. L. B, 3d 845. 
Law Reviews, 
The Constitutional Right to Keep and 
Sec, 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person s 11 a 11 b e d e [) i• I v c (I t) l" 1 
process of law. 
Comparable Provision, 
Montana Const,, \i• t, 111, § 27. 
Cross-Reference. 
Eminent domain generally',, 78-34.-1 et 
seq. 
In general. 
"Due process of law" comes to us from 
the Great Charter and is synonymous with 
' 'law of the land." I t means that a party 
shall have his day in court—trial. Jensen 
v. Union Pac. By. Co., C I J. 253, 21 P. 991, 
4 L. R. A. 724. 
Due process of law is not necessarily 
judicial process. People v, liasbrouck, 11 
U. 291, 39 P. 918. 
Judgment against defendant, not served 
with process and not appearing either in 
person or by attorney, would not be duo 
process of law. Blyth & Fargo Co. v, 
Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027. 
I t is elementary that there can be no 
judicial action affecting vested rights that 
is not based upon some process or notice 
whereby the interested parties are brought 
within the jurisdiction of the judicial 
tribunal about to render judgment. Parry 
v. Bonneville Irr . Dist., 71 V. 202, 263 P. 
751. 
"Due process of law" requires that, be-
fore one can be bound by a judgment 
affecting his property rights, some process 
must be served upon him which in some 
degree at least is calculated to give him 
notice. Naisbi t t v. Ilerrick, 70 U. 575, 
290 P. 950. 
Due process of law requires that notice 
be given to the persons whose rights are 
to be affected. I t hears beforo it con-
demns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial. Biggins v. Dis-
tr ict Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 
183, 51 P . 2d 645. 
The phrase "due process of law" appar-
ently originated with Lord Coke, who de-
fined tho terms. Many at tempts have been 
made to further define duo process of law, 
but all of them resolve into the thought 
that a par ty shall have his day in court. 
Christiansen v, Harris, 109 U." 1, 103 P. 
2d 314. 
In depriving a person of life or lib 
erty, the essentials of due process are: 
(a) the existence of a competent person, 
:. v-, i r '.in.- T, • i c'."'. ' V a t e i")", 2 S II a i v, 
L. lu-v. 4 7.i. 
Restrictions on I .i.^i.i To Bear Arms 
-••State and Feder ' ;" anus Legislation, 
98 I J Pa, I p 
iIt"i ;", IiI: ,• i*t\' o r p r o p i T t y , \vi111o111 (111e 
body, or agency authorized by law to de-
termine the questions; (b) an inquiry 
into the merits of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the 
person of the inauguration and purpose 
of the inquiry and tho time at which 
such person should appear if ho wishes 
to be heard; (d) right to appear in per-
son or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity 
to submit evidence, examine and cross-
examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be 
rendered upon tho record thus made lit 
the absence of statute laying down other 
or more specific requirements, the above 
conditions meet the demands of due 
process. In the absence of specific pro* 
visions to the contrary, duo process does 
not require that any or all of these 
requirements must bo in writ ing or in 
any particular form, In the interests of 
orderly procedure and certainty as to its 
proceedings and action taken, any legally 
constituted body or agency should as far 
as practical have written records of all 
proceedings before it, except whero other 
wise provided bv law. Christian, sen v 
Harris, 109 U. 1, 103 P. 2d 314. 
In the trial of criminal cases the stat-
utes prescribe certain rules of procedure, 
which must bo substantially complied with 
to keep tho proceedings within the due 
processes of the law. A somewhat dif-
ferent set of rules is prescribed in civil 
cases and in special proceedings. Some 
rules, affecting all types, are not found in 
tho statutes, but in that great basic body 
of tho law commonly known as the deci-
sions or rules of the courts. But all these 
methods and means provided for tho pro-
tection and enforcement of human rights 
have the samo basic requirements—that 
no party can bo affected by such action, 
until his legal rights have been the sub-
ject of an inquiry by a person or body 
authorized by law to dctormino such 
rights, of which inquiry tho party has duo 
notice, and at which he had mi opportu-
nity to bo hoard and to give evidence as 
to his rights or defenses, Christiansen v. 
Harris, 109 U. 1, 103 P. 2d 311. 
While normally we think of "due proc-
ess of law" as requiring judicial action, 
yet "due process" is not necessarily judi-
cial a ct ion. Christians e 11 v, J1; i r r i », J i) 9 
II. I, 103 P. 2d 314. 
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of the last sentence of subsec. (2); and n wide ' : cxcli ided from i liapU'i, 
minor changes in punctuation. . . 
or disposition of collateral without 
Cross-Refcrcnces,
 : t i n g permissible, 70A-9-205. 
Liabi l i ty of secured p a r t y for fa i lure to 
c o m p l y w i t h p a r t 5 of t h i s c h a p t e r , - '•t- -cf---cnces. 
70A-9-507. Secure ; : ' ra:^. ict ions <i> 227. 
Policy and scope of chapter , 70A-9-102. 79 CJS o*pp. Jccui ed Ti ansact ions § 10*1. 
Secured p a r t y ' s r i gh t s on disposi t ion of 69 A m J u r 2d 469 to 473, Secured T r a n s -
col lateral , 70A-9-306. act ions §§ 580 to 582. 
Secured par ty ' s r ight to dispose of collat-
eral after default , 70A-9-504. 
/OA-J-5U3. Secured party's right to lake possession after default. 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the 
peace or may proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the 
secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make 
it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured 
party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a 
secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collat-
eral on the debtor's premises under section 70A-9-504. If a secured party 
elects to proceed by process of law he may proceed by writ of replevin or 
otherwise, 
H i s t o r y : L 1965, ch. 154, § 9-503. - - -
}
 'al idity, under s ta te law, of self-help 
Cross-Re fere n c e s. j ; j : ,. s ess ion of goods pursuant to UCC 
."i Jred party's right to dispose of collat $ 9 5 0 3 » 7 5 A L R 3d 1 0 6 L 






 !fh of t h e *?<*« a n f ^ e w Mexico's Uni-
torm Commercial Code, 4 Natura l Resources 
Secured Transac t ions <§=> 228, J, 85. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transac t ions § 105. Note, Sniadach , Fuen te s and Mitchell: A 
69 A m J u r 2d 473 to 497, Secured T r a n s - Confusing Tri logy and U t a h P r e j u d g m e n t 
act ions §§ 583 to 599, Remedies, 1974 I Hah I Rev, 536, 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
R e p l e v i n , gagee could m a i n t a i n action in claim and 
Where chat te l mor tgage provided tha t in de l ivery to recover such possess ion af ter 
event default was made in payment of debt default, remedy by foreclosing mortgage not 
mor tgagee could take possession of proper ty being exclusive. Morgan v. Layton (1922) GO 
and proceed to foreclose mor tgage , mor t - U 280, 208 P 505. 
7 0 A - 9 - 5 0 4, Sec u r e d party's r i g 1 11: t o d i s p o s e o fl c o 11 a t e r a 1 a f I: c r 
default — Effect of disposition, 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otl lei wise dispose 
of any or all of the collateral ii i its then condition or following any 
commercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of 
goods is subject to the chapter on Sales (chapter 2), The proceeds 
of disposition shall be applied in the order following to 
345 
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(a) the reasonable expen i retaking, holding, preparing for 
sale or lease, selling, having and the like and, to the extent 
provided for in the agreement and not prohibited by l.u the 
reasonable attorneys' ff*es and legal expenses incurred b> the 
secured party; 
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured bj the senility 
interest under which the disposition is made, 
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by an> subonlinate 
security interest in the collateral if written notification of 
demand therefor is received before distribution of the pro-
ceeds is completed. If requested by the secured party, the 
holder of a subordinate security interest must seasonably 
furnish reasonable proof of his interest, and unless he does 
so, the secured party need not comply with his demand. 
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party 
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise 
agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying 
transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is 
entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the 
security agreement so provides 
Disposition of the collateral may be by public 01 pnvate plotted-
ings and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or 
other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels anil tit an> tune, 
and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition 
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be com-
mercially reasonable Unless collateral is perishable or threatens 
to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a 
recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of 
any public salt or reasonable notification of I lie time after which 
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall 
be sent by the secured party to the debtor, if he has not signed 
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his right to noti-
fication of sale. In the case of consumer goods no other notification 
need be sent. In other cases notification shall be sent to any other 
secured party from whom the secured party has received (before 
sending his notification to the debtor or before the debtor's renun-
ciation of his rights) written notice of a claim of an interest in the 
collateral. The secured party may buy at an) public sale and if the 
collateral is of a type customarily sold in a recognized market or 
is of a type which is the subject of widely distributor! stand ml 
price quotations he may buy at private sahj 
When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the 
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's 
rights therein, discharges the security interest under which it is 
made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto ihe 
346 
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purchaser takes free of all such rights and interests even though 
the secured party fails to comply with the requirements of this part 
or of any judicial proceedings 
f.ii ii 1 the case of a public sale, if i::i- p.;rchasci nas no knowl-
edge of any defects in the sale and if he does r.ut buy In col-
lusion with the secured party -'* i.-|->. - - the* person 
conducting the sale; or 
(b) in any other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith. 
(5) A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, 
ii idorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a 
transfer of collateral from the secured party or is subrogated to 
his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured party. 
Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of the col-
ljt«M 'l 'Mulor this chapter, 
History: L 1%5, ch. 13-1, § 9-50-1; 1977, ch. 
272, § 38. 
Compiler 's Notes, 
The 1977 amendment inserted "or lease" 
near the beginning of subd. (1) (a); added the 
second sentence of subsec. (2) relating to a 
sale of accounts or chattel paper; substituted 
"if he has not signed after default a state-
ment renouncing or modifying his right to 
notification o( sale" at the end of the third 
sentence of subsec. (3) for "and except in the 
case of consumer goods to any other person 
who has a security interest in the collateral 
and who has duly filed a financing statement 
indexed in the name of the debtor in this 
state or who is known by the secured party 
to have a security interest in the collateral"; 
and inserted the fourth sentence of subsec. 
(3) relating to notification of other secured 
parties. 
C ross-Refere n c e s. 
Collateral not owned by debtor, 70A-9-112, 
Compulsory disposit ion of col lateral , 
70A-9-505. 
Cont rac t for sale of goods, breach by 
buyer, resale by seller, 70A-2-706. 
Policy and subject ma t t e r of chapter , 
70A-9-102. 
Secured party's liability for failure to corn-
ply with part 5 of this chapter, 70A-9-507. 
Forec losure by adver t i sement or sale 
Per ishable proper ty or livestock, 
In proceeding under former section 9-1-6, 
relating to mortgagor's right to enjoin fore-
closure by advertisement and sale, court had 
Notice of disposition. 
Secured party is b.». .i . .,u:n um.i.'. ng a 
deficiency judgment after a disposition of the 
property securing the debt when* ** ~" of 
the disposition was given the d» w 
disposition was not conducted ; r 
cially reasonable manner FV ;' 
Corp. v, P r o - P r i n t s f'r*7r< VM 
Notice of sale. 
Secured party should give notice of time 
and place of sale of the collateral to a 
guarantor of the debt. Zions First Nat, Bank 
v. Hurst (1977) 570 P 2d 1031. 
Collateral References, 
Secured Transactions <S> 229 to 237, 240. 
79 CJS Supp. Secured Transactions §§ 106 
to 113. 
69 AmJur 2d 499 to 532, Secured Trans-
actions §§602 to 624. 
Rights and duties of parties to conditional 
sales contract as to resale of repossessed 
property, 49 ALR 2d 15. 
Uniform Commercial Code: burden of proof 
as to commercially reasonable disposition of 
collateral, 59 ALR 3d 369. 
Uniform Commercial Code: failure of 
secured creditor to give required notice of 
disposition of collateral as bar to deficiency 
judgment, 59 ALR 3d 401. 
What constitutes a "public sale," 4 ALR 2d 
575. 
power, where it appeared that mortgaged 
property was perishable, or that it was live-
stock and that cost of feeding and keeping it 
pending action would be great, to call on 
mortgagor to consent to sale or furnish 
inclemnity bond to hoid mortgagee harn 11 css, 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
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the court otherwise orders. Notice of objection 
and counsel within (5) days after service, 
(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall also be reduced to writing 
and presented to the court for signature within fifteen (1 5) days -*rr' •••*h* 
merit and dismissal. 
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon 
the opposing party and proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All 
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be transmitted 
after signature by the judge, including other correspondence requiring a re-
ply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage. 
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner 
as to show whether they are entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the 
motion of counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall identify the 
attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or 
decree is made, 
(6) Except where • 1> ] ' ai • "vise ordered, all judgments and decrees shall con 
tain the address or : • >_ ;ast known address of the judgment debtor and the 
social security number of the judgment debtor if known, 
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as separate documents and 
shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the 
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees may be made a part of the 
documents containing the stipulation or r i lotioi i upon which the order is 
based. 
(8) No orders, jv. -crees based upon stipulation shall be signed 
or entered unless
 t ...u:_n is in writing, signed by the attorneys of 
record for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or the stipulation was 
made on the record. 
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a \v rittei i obligatioi i to pay 
money and a judgment has previously been rendered upon the same written 
obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel shall attach to the new com-
plaint a copy of all previous judgments based upon the same written obliga-
tioi i, 
Rule 4-505. Attorneys1 fees affidavits. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a i; .t ;>oi t 
of attorneys' fees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern tl le award of attorneys' fees in the trial courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' fees must set forth specif-
ically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the 
attorney, the number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the 
time spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees are 
claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal ser-
vices. The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than 
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed. 
(2) If the fee arrangement with the client is other than at an hourly rate an 
affidavit of the client or correspondence from the client shall be filed with the 
Rn LIJ ; f 506 :>()DE 01 ' , n IDICI A I \ DMI2 IISTR \;T!()1 1 1 0 ! 
court setting forth the terms ai id coi ,. liti : i is : I tl .e i i i i .i lge :r: I : i: it "I letl ler a 
flat rate or contingent fee, or the p ei: cent age :)!: f I u ids i e ::c: ei ed oi dealt with, 
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is 
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following 
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the 
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred 
in pursuit of collection: 
UAND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT 
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING 
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL 
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT." 
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be awarded except as they 
conform to the provisions of this rule 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in 
civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) An attorney may w itl ldi aw as counsel of record in all cases except where 
withdrawal would result in a delay of trial. In that case, an attorney may not 
withdraw without the approval cf the court 
(2) When an attorney withdraw.- as counsel - ol the 
withdrawal must be served upon the client oi .
 w ^' and 
upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service m eu 
with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdra 
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial iaic. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from 
the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify the 
unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another attorney or 
appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings 
against the client. 
RUL. 
'Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee affidavits of deposit and 
claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales. 
To establish a uniform procedure in determining the disposition of f i inds :)ii 
trustee's sales. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts of record. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the Court any proceeds from 
a trustee's sale in accordance with I Jtah Code Ann. Section 57 ] -29, the 
PREFERRED VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made tl i e _ 29th. _ _ _ l i | ail December , 19*A_i '-"'l'.1 JHJ 
between _m _ _ _ _ __ m , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ „ 
LMV LEASING, INC., 121 Freeport Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15 238 




MCQ^DBA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR. RENTAL _ _ 
1380 W. North Temple Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
hereinafter called "Lessee". — " ——— 
WHEREAS, Lessee contemplates the leasing of various vehicles; and 
WHEREAS, Lessor is willing to lease said vehicles upon the terms and conditions hereinafter 
set forth; 
NOW, THEREFORE* the parties hereto do mutually agree as follows* 
1. DEFINITIONS As herein usedt 
1.1 "Accounting Form91 is a record with respect to a specific vehicle. 
Accounting Form will show the date of delivery of the vehicle, the make, 
manufacturer, model number, serial number, Agreed Price* Rental Payment, 
Base Lease Term in months* Interim Rental, Interim Lease Term* location and 
such other applicable details as Lessor and Leasee may desire. 
1.2 "Acquisition Fee" is a charge made by Lessor for procuring each vehici 
amount and manner of payment are set forth in Schedule "A". 
1.3 "Administrative Fee" is a monthly service charge payable by Lessee 
tgreed upon between Lessor and Lessee as set forth in Schedule "A", 
i.» "Agreed Price* of any vehicle is determined as set forth in Schedule "A 
1.5 "Base Lease Term", with respect to any vehicle* is the period commencing on the 
15th day ol the month following the month in which such vehicle is first 
delivered to Lettee and ending on the 14th day of the month identified in tl c 
Purchase Order as the last month of the Base Lease Term. 
1.6 "Basic Rent*, when used* combines and replaces Financing Charge" and "Monthly 
Depreciation"* and* if used* is as set forth in Schedule "A". 
1.7 'book Value" of any vehicle is the Agreed Price .less th i t a^|reg«- | , /( i i ; 
Depreciating 
l.S "Extended Rental* is a charge made by Lessor and payable by Lessee as set fort' 
in Schedule "A" for continuing to lease any vehicle beyond, the Base Lease Te 
therof. 
L..9 "Financing Charge* is a component of is: 1 ) it rmonthly Rental Payment deterf 
is set forth in Schedule "A". 
1 10 "Interim Lease Term"* with respect to any vehicle* is (a) in the case of 
by the manufacturer* the period commencing on the 10th day foil' 
shipping date (as set forth in the manufacturer's invoice* a copy of wh 
delivered to Lessee) of such vehicle by the manufacturer thereof an<* 
of delivery by anyone other than the manufacturer* commencing ' 
delivery of such vehicle to Lessee and ending, in each 
Interim Lease Term") plus (b) tne perioc, n any, commencing on trie 
day on which Laaaaa raturna such vahlcla to Lessor In connection with 
Lessee*a axarciaa of any option to terminate the lease of such 
vehicle prior to the regularly schedule expiration of the Base Lease 
Tars thereof (provided that on such day Lessee pays to Lessor the 
monthly Rental Payment due on such date, if any), and ending on the 
day on which Leaaor shall have received the net proceeds of sale of 
such vehicle together with any termination payment due under Section 
19 from Lessee with respect to such sale the ("Second Interim Lease 
Term"). 
1.11 "Interim Rental" is the amount payable by Lessee to Lessor with 
respect to the lease of any vehicle during the Interim Lease Term 
thereof and shall be equal to the Financing Charge multiplied by the 
unamortized balance of the Agreed Price, computed on the basis of a 
360-day year and twelve 30-day months, for the actual number of days 
involved• 
1.12 "Monthly Depreciation" for any vehicle is that portion of the monthly 
Rental Payment which is used to reduce the Agreed Price to Book 
Value. 
1.13 "Overall Lease Term" with respect to any vehicle is the period 
consisting of the Interim Lease Term and the Base Lease Term thereof; 
provided, however, that it also includes any other period, whether 
prior to the Interim Lease Term or the subsequent to the expiration 
or other termination of the Base Leaae Term or the Interim Lease 
Term, ae the case may be, during which Lessee has possession of such 
vehicle (including any period contemplated by Section 3.4. 
1.14 "Purchase Order" la a form supplied or approved by Lessor and signed 
(or electronically entered) by Lessee that specif lea the Lessee's 
preference as to delivery area, date of delivery, vehicle to be 
furnished, the make, manufacturer, model number, color, accessories, 
optional items and any other features to be furnished and the number 
of months in the Baae Leaae Term. 
1.15 "Rental Payment" la the amount payable by Lessee to Lessor each month 
for the uae of a specific vehicle during the Base Leaae Term thereof 
and conalata of, but is not necessarily limited tot 
Monthly Depreciation (1.12 above) Baalc Rent (1.6 above) 
Financing Charge (1.9 above) Maintenance (6 below) 
Administrative Fee (1.3 above) Taxea and Pees (7 below) 
1.16. "Settlement Fee" la a charge made by Leaaor at termination of the 
leaae of each vehicle aa set forth in Schedule "A". 
1.17 "Termination Value", with reapect to any vehicle, is the amount 
determined in accordance with Exhibit "I" and payable pursuant to 
Section 19. 
1.18 "Vehicle" means one or more automobiles, vana, trucks or similar 
iteme. 
2. LXAJI /U.WIHisTT 
2.1 Leaaor hereby leaaea to Lessee, and the Leasee hereby leases from 
Lessor, the vehicles described in Accounting Forma delivered and/or 
to be delivered upon the terme and conditions set forth in this 
Agreement, aa supplemented with reapect to each vehicle by the terms 
and condition a aet forth in the appropriate Accounting Form 
identifying auch vehicle. 
2.2 The vehiclee to be leased hereunder shall be those identified and 
specified in Purchase Orders placed by Leasee with Lessor from time 
to time and which Leaaor undertakea to have delivered to Lessee. In 
the event the usual supplier of any particular vehicle la unable to 
provide the **m* in time to meet the delivery date specified by 
Lessee, Leeeor and Lessee shall agree on substituted actions 
appropriate to the circumstance. Upon delivery of any vehicle, 
Lessee shall -2-
d t | i ¥ f r t 0 L f S S o r a delivery receipt signed by the individual to whom delivery is 
authorized 'by Lessee. Upon delivery of a vehicle to Lessee, Lessor md Lessee 
shall exedite an • Accounting Form with respect to such vehicle. Except as 
specifically modified with respect to any vehicle by the terms and conditions set 
forth in the appropriate Accounting Form identifying such vehicle, ail of the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement shall govern the rights and obligations of 
Lessor and Lessee. Whatever reference is made to "this Agreement11 it shall be 
deemed to include, as required., the one or more Accounting Forms identifying 
the vehicle, 
i" I Each vehicle shall at all times be the sole and exclusive property of Lessor, and 
Lessee shall have no right, title or interest therein except the right to use the 
same as herein provided. As long as Lessee is not in default in any obligation to 
Lessor, Lessee may use the vehicles in the regular course of its business for any 
lawful purpose. 
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Form relating thereto. 
This Agreement shall remain in effect until such time as no further vehicles are 
subject hereto and until Lessee has satisfied in full all of its obligations to Lessor 
with respect to any vehicle at any time leased hereunder. Provided that no 
Event of Default shall have occurred and be continuing, the termination of this 
Agreement in respect of any vehicle shall not affect any other vehicle subject 
hereto at the time of such termination and any such other vehicle shall remain 
subject to the terms of this Agreement and the appropriate Accounting Form 
identifying such other vehicle. 
33 Lessee may retire from service any vehicle leased pursuant to this Agreement by 
giving to Lessor written notice and surrendering possession of such vehicle to 
Lessor at the point where same was originally delivered to Lessee, or at such 
other point as may be mutually agreed upon. The lease as to such vehicle shall 
terminate upon the date such vehicle is sold by Lessor pursuant to Section 19, 
subject, howeverf to the provisions hereof including, but not limited to, Sections 
16 and 19. 
At Lessee's option any vehicle may be continued in service beyond tl ic Base 
Lease Term thereof, in which event (a) the monthly rental due therefor during 
such continuation will be the Extended Rental and (b) no Interim Rental will be 
payable with respect to any Second Interim Lease Term of such vehicle. 
" RENTAL PAYMENTS 
*.l Lessee agrees to pay Lessor, as rent for each vehicle leased hereunder, Interim 
Rental and monthly Rental Payments, and any other charges due, during each 
month oi the Overall Lease Term with respect to such vehicle in such amounts as 
are set forth in the Accounting Form relating to such vehicle and are calculated 
in accordance with methods of computation set forth in Schedule "A*. With 
respect to each vehicle, all rent and other charges shall be due and payable on or 
before the fifteenth (15th) day oi each month during the Overall Lease Term 
thereof, commencing with the first such fifteenth (13th) day after the 
commencement of the Interim Lease Term with respect to such vehicle. A 
LATE CHARGE OF 2% OF THE AMOUNT DUE WITH A MINIMUM CHARGE OF 
$2.00 WILL BE ADDED TO EACH SUCH PAYMENT UNPAID ON THE DUE 
DATE AND THE SAME CHARGE WILL BE AODED FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT 
MONTH OR PART THEREOF ON WHICH SUCH PAYMENT REMAINS UNPAID-
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•^2 With respect to any vehicle returned to Lessor pursuant to Section 3J, monthly 
Rental Payments shall cease on the day after the return date* 
<*.3 Interim Rental and monthly Rental Payments shall be paid to Lessor at the 
address set forth above or such other address as Lessor shall provide to Lessee. 
5. WARRANTIES 
LESSOR, NOT BEING THE MANUFACTURER OR A DISTRIBUTOR OF THE 
VEHICLES NOR THE MANUFACTURER'S OR A DISTRIBUTOR'S AGENT, MAKES NO 
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION OF ANY KIND WHATSOEVfcR 
WITH RESPECT TO ANY VEHICLE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO: THE 
MERCHANTABILITY OF THE VEHICLE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE; THE DESIGN OR CONDITION OF THE VEHICLE; THE QUALITY OR CAPACITY 
OF THE VEHICLE; THE WORKMANSHIP IN THE VEHICLE; COMPLIANCE OF THE 
VEHICLE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ANY LAWf RULE, SPECIFICATION OR 
CONTRACT PERTAINING THERETO; PATENT INFRINGEMENT; IT BEING AGREED THAT 
THE VEHICLES ARE LEASED "AS IS", WITHOUT LIMITING THE GENERALITY OF THE 
FOREGOING, LESSOR SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEFECTS, EITHER LATENT OR 
PATENT IN ANY VEHICLE, OR FOR ANY DIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE 
THEREFROM, OR FOR ANY LOSS OF USE THEROF OR FOR ANY INTERRUPTION IN 
LESSEE'S BUSINESS BY ITS INABILITY TO USE ANY VEHICLE FOR ANY REASON 
WHATSOEVER. Lessee will be subrogated to Lessor's claims, ii any, agamst the 
manufacturer or supplier of any vehicle for breach of any warranty or representation, by 
such manufacturers or suppliers and, upon written request from Lessee, Lessor shall take all 
reasonable action requested by Lessee to eniorce any such warranty, express or implied, 
issued on or applicable to any vehicle which is enforceable by Leseor in its own name, 
provided, however, that (a) no Event of Default has occurred and (b) Lessor shall not be 
obligated to take any action to enforce any such warranty unless Lessee shall pay all 
expenses in connection therewith. Upon request by Lessor, Lessee shall pay Lessor's 
reasonably estimated costs in advance* Notwithstanding the foregoing. Lessee's obligations 
to pay the Interim Rental, monthly Rental Payments and other charges under this 
Agreement shall be and are absolute and unconditional. All proceeds of any such warranty 
recovered from the manufacturer or supplier of a vehicle shall first be used to repair the 
affected vehicle* 
6. MAINTENANCE REPAIRS, OPERATING EXPENSES AND RETURN OP VEHICLES. 
6.1 Unless otherwise specified in a schedule hereto separately signed by Lessor, 
Lessee will pay for all maintenance and repairs to keep the vehicles in good 
working order and condition and any other expenses associated with operating 
the vehicles. Lessee will service the vehicles according to the manufacturers' 
recommendations as outlined in the owner's manual and the maintenance 
schedule folder accompanying each vehicle* 
6.2 Lessee will return each vehicle at the end of the lease thereof in good condition 
with no excessive wear and tear including, among other things* (1) no glass 
breakage or discoloration, (2) no damage or deterioration of body, fenders, metal 
work, trim or paint, (3) no original equipment including wheel covers or tires 
(including spare) that are missing or not in safe condition, (6) no damage from 
flood water, hail, or sandy and (7) no damage or alteration that makes the vehicle 
either unsafe or unlawful to operate. 
6.3 Lessee shall comply with any and all governmental requirements affecting the 
maintenance, operation or use of each of the vehicles including, without 
limitation, any changes or safeguards therein to keep each of the vehicles in such 
compliance. Any replacement parts, changes in or improvements to each of the 
vehicles shall become and remain the property of Lessor* 
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7. LICENSE, REGISTRATION, TAXES AND INSPECTION. 
Lessee will be responsible lor payment for titling, registration and licensing and all 
inspections of the veriicles required by any government authority during the overall lease 
term. Lessee must pay for all excise, sale, use, personal property, gross receipts, and other 
taxes incurred, or assessed by federal, state or local governments, during the Overall Lease 
Term whether with respect to this Agreement or the ownership, lease, use or operation of 
the vehicle, or with respect to the receipt of rental and other payments by Lessor, except 
those taxes levied on the net income of the Lessor, provided that the foregoing exception 
shall not apply to any such net income taxes which are in substitution for, or relieve the 
Lessee from the payment of, taxes which it would otherwise be obligated to pay or 
reimburse. Lessee shall comply with all federal, state, county and municipal statutes, 
ordinances, rules, and regulations which may be applicable to the leasing, use, insuring, 
condition, maintenance or operation of the vehicles hereunder, and shall prepare and furnish 
to Lessor all documents, returns, or forms legally required thereunder. Lessee shall provide 
all drivers or other operators of the vehicles and shall be soley responsible for any and all 
fines, penalties and forfeitures (including, without limitation, the confiscation of any of the 
vehicles) arising out of or due to the use, operation, condition, maintenance or insuring of 
each of the vehicles in violation of any law, regulation, statute or similar requirement of 
any governmental authority. 
8. DELIVERY 
5.1 Lessor will not be responsible for any loss resulting from delay in delivery of any 
vehicle. 
8.2 Lessee hereby warrants to Lessor that any person accepting delivery of any 
vehicle has authority to do so on behalf of Lessee and that the signature of such 
person on any document executed in connection herewith shall be binding on 
Lessee. 
9. USE. 
9.1 Lessee will allow only licensed drivers to operate the vehicles and Lessee agrees 
that Lessee (if a natural person) and all such licensed drivers are drivers in good 
standing under the laws of the state in which they are licensed and- have not 
within the past five (5) years had any driver's license suspended or revoked or had 
any insurance premium adjusted because of a poor driving record. 
9.2 Lessee will keep the vehicles free of all fines, liens and encumbrances. If Lessor 
receives notice' of any motor vehicle violation relating to any vehicle, Lessor 
may charge Lessee a reasonable service charge, as determined by Lessor from 
time to timet for processing such notice. Nothing in this Section 9.2 shall 
require Lessor, however, to take any action with respect to such notice. 
9.3 Lessee will not use the vehicles illegally, improperly or for hire, or permit such 
use* 
9.4 Lessee will not use the vehicles to pull trailers unless designed for that purpose. 
9.5 L si see will not remove the vehicles from the continental United States. 
9.6 Lessee will not alter, mark or install equipment in the vehicles without Lessor's 
written consent* 
9.7 Lessee will not change the locations at which the vehicles are permanently 
garaged without prior notification to Lessor of such relocation* 
10. OWNERSHIP. 
10.1 This Agreement is a lease only and Lessor remains the owner of the vehicles* 
This Agreement is a net lease and Lessee shall not be entitled to any abatement 
of Interim Rentals, Rental Payments or other amounts payable hereunder or 
reduction thereof, including, but not limited to, abatements or reductions due to 
any present or future claims of Lessee against Lessor under this Agreement or 
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otherwise, or against the manufacturer or vendor of the vehicles nor. except as 
otherwise Jxpressly provided herein, shall this Agreement terminate, or the 
respective obligations of Lessor or Lessee be otherwise affected, by reason of 
any defect in.or damage to or loss or destruction of aU or any of the vehicles 
from whatsoever cause, the taking or requisitioning of ail or any vehicles by 
condemnation or otherwise, the prohibition by law of Lessee's use of ail or any 
vehicles, the interference with such use by any private person or corporation, the 
invalidity or unenforceability or lack of due authorization or other infirmity of 
this Agreement, or lack of right, power or authority of Lessor to enter into this 
Agreement, or for any other cause whether similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, 
any present or future law to the contrary notwithstanding, it being the intention 
of the parties hereto that the rents and other amounts payable by Lessee 
hereunder shall continue to be payable in ail events unless the obligation to pay 
the same shall be terminated pursuant to the terms hereof* 
10.2 Lessee will not transfer, sublease, or rent any of the vehicles or do anything to 
interfere with Lessor1* ownership of the vehicles* Lessee agrees that this Lease 
will be treated as a true lease for federal income tax purposes and that unless 
there is a written agreement with Lessor to the contrary, Lessor will receive all 
of the tax and other benefits of ownership of the vehicles and Lessee will not 
claim any depreciation or ACRS deductions or investment tax credits with 
respect to the vehicles* Lessee will, from time to time, execute such statements 
as may be requested by Lessor in order to confirm Lessor's ownership of the 
vehicles and Lessor's right to claim such tax benefits with respect thereto* 
11. RISK OF LOSS AND INSURANCE. 
AU risks of loss from public liability, damage to property or third persons, or damage 
to each vehicle, whether caused by an unavoidable casualty, accident, abuse or misuse 
thereof by Lessee, its employees, agents or others, shall be borne by Lessee* Lessee shall 
provide public liability and prupei tf kmsge coverage, coverage •gtimr fire end rtaff end 
ssmpisMaiim and *=*****—+*=*mmmQ* with a responsible qualified insurance company 
acceptable to Lessor, protecting the interests of Lessor and Lessee against liability for 
damages for personal injury or death, property damage to others, or damage to the vehicles 
wherever such vehicles may be used or be located, ail as set forth in Schedule "A". Said 
insurance shall not be excess over other coverage, but shall be primary insurance up to and 
including the limits set forth in Scheduled*. Said insurance policies shall be satisfactory to 
Lessor as to form and substance, shall be payable to Lessor or its assigns *s their interests 
may appear and shall name Lessor as an additional named insured without liability for 
premiums* Said policies shaill provide for at least ten (10) days written notice of 
cancellation to Lessor or its assigns and Lessee shall furnish certificates, policies or 
endorsements to Lessor or any such assigns as proof of such insurance* Lessor or its assigns 
may act as attorney for Lessee in making, adjusting or settling any claims under any 
insurance policies insuring the vehicles* Lessee assigns to Lessor all of its right, title, and 
interest to any-infurance policies insuring the vehicles, including all rights to receive the 
proceeds of insurance not in excess of the unpaid obligations under this Lease, and directs 
any insurer to pay all such proceeds directly to Lessor or its assigns and authorizes Lessor or 
its assigns to endorse Lessee's name on any draft for such proceeds* No such loss, danuge, 
theft or destruction of any vehicle, in whole or part* shall impair the obligations of Lessee 
under this Agreement, all ol which shall continue in full force and effect subject to Lessee's 
right to terminate the lease of any vehicle pursuant to Section 3*3* After compliance with 
the foregoing to Lessor's satisfaction, and provided no Event of Default has occurred and is 
continuing. Lessee shall be subrogated to Lessor's rights with respect to any insurance 
policies or claims for reimbursement by others with respect to such loss. 
12- GENERAL INOEMNITY. 
Lessee assumes liability for and hereby agrees to indemnify, protect, and save and 
keep harmless Lessori its agents, servants, successors and assigns from and against all 
claims, whether or not due in whole or in part to any act or omission or other negligence of 
Lessor, its agents, servants, successors, assigns or any of their employees, for losses, 
damages, injuries, costs, expenses, attorneys' fees and court costs arising out of the use, 
condition (including, but not limited to, latent and other defects, whether or not 
discoverable by it), or operation of any vehicle, regardless of where, how and by whom 
operated or arising out of or resulting from the condition of the vehicles sold or disposed of 
after use by Lessee or, if Lessee shall not take delivery of any vehicle hereunder, after 
Lessee shall have signed (or electronically entered) a Purchase Order with respect to such 
vehicle arising out of or resulting from any claims that the manufacturer or supplier of such 
vehicle may assert against Lessor with respect to such Purchase Order . Lessee shall 
assume the settlement of, and the defense of any suit or suits, or other legal proceedings 
brought to enforce all such losses, damages, injuries, claims, demands and expenses, and 
shall pay all judgments entered in any such suit or suits or other legal proceedings. The 
indemnities and assumptions of liabilities and obligations herein provided for shall continue 
in full force and effect from and after the date of Lessee's execution of this Agreement, 
notwithstanding the subsequent termination hereof by expiration of time, by operation of 
law, or otherwise. Lessee shall indemnify, protect and save and keep harmless Lessor, its 
agents, servants, successors and assigns from and against all liability arising under Title IV 
of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Saving Act, P.L. 92-313, and similar laws of any 
other jurisdiction relating to false or inaccurate odometer readings* Lessee hereby 
represents and warrants that this Agreement constitutes a "qualified motor vehicle 
operating agreement11, as defined in Section 16* (f) (13) of the Internal Revenue Code, and 
shall indemnify Lessor in the event of the incorrectness of such representation and warranty 
pursuant to this Section 12. Lessee is an independent contractor and nothing contained in 
the Agreement shall authorize Lessee or any other person to operate any vehicle so as to 
incur or impose any liability or obligation for or on behalf of Lessor. 
13. ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE BY lP\SffE| CHANCE IN CONTROL. 
13.1 Without Lessor's prior written consent, Lessee may not, by operation or law or 
otherwise} (a) assign, transfer, pledget hypothecate or otherwise dispose of this 
Agreement or any interest therein or (b) sublet or lend the vehicles or permit the 
same to be used by anyone ~other than Lessee or Lessee's employees, except that, 
following written notice to Lessor, it may sublet the same to any of its present 
or future subsidiaries or affiliated companies, but every such sublease shall be 
subject and subordinate to the terms of this Agreement and shall in no event 
relieve Lmee ol its obligations hereunder, and each such sublessee shall, in 
addition, agree in writing with Lessor at the time of the sublease to be bound by 
the terms and conditions hereof. 
13.2 If there is a change in control of Lessee, such change in control shall be deemed 
o be a transfer of this Agreement for purposes of Section 13.1. In addition to 
ny actual change of control a change in control shall be deemed to occurred if, 
t any timet the ownership of more than 30 percent of either the voting power of 
alue of the equity interests in Lessee is different than on the date hereof. 
4MENT BY LESSOR. 
t purpose of providing funds for financing the purchase of vehicles to be leased 
r for any other purpose, Lessor may assign to any third party all or any part of 
le and interest in and to this Agreement and in and to the vehicles and monies 
due and to become due to the Lessor hereunder. In such event all the provisions of this 
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Agreement for the benefit of Lessor shall, to the extent of the rights assigned, inure to the 
benefit of and may, to'such extent, be exercised by or on behalf of such third party, and ail 
rental payments and 'other amounts due and to become due under this Agreement and 
assigned to such third party, upon notice by Lessor or assignee to Lessee, shall be paid 
directly to such third party, and THE RIGHTS OF SUCH ASSIGNEE SHALL NOT BE 
SUBJECT TO ANY DEFENSE, COUNTERCLAIM OR SET-OFF WHICH LESSEE MAY HAVE 
AGAINST LESSOR, for any claim of the Lessee whatsoever; whether arising from breach of 
warranty or representation relating to any vehicle, or arising from the termination of this 
Agreement or of any lease of any vehicle hereunder, or arising from the breach or failure of 
Lessor to observe or perform any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement or of any 
other agreement or transaction whatsoever between Lessor and the Lessee. Lessee agrees 
to make prompt payment to such third party of the rentals and other amounts so assigned 
even though bankruptcy, reorganization, arrangement, insolvency, liquidation or dissolution 
proceedings are instituted by or against the Lessor and regardless of whether a trustee or 
receiver in any such proceedings shall assume or reject this Agreement. In the event of such 
assignment, the liability of Lessee to pay such third party the full amount of the rental and 
other sums assigned with respect to each vehicle hereunder shall not be terminated, 
notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, unless (1) Lessee shall have paid 
such third party all assigned sums due hereunder with respect to such vehicle or (2) such 
third party or Lessor shall have furnished to Lessee a release executed by such third party 
in substantially the following form: 
"The vehicle herein described has been released from the assignment made by 
LMV LEASING, INC, to the undersigned". (Signature of third party or 
authorized officer to be added.) 
Such third party shall have no obligation or liabilities under this Agreement by reason of or 
arising out of such assignment, nor shall such third party be required or obligated in any 
manner to perform or fulfill any duties or obligations of the Lessor under this Agreement. 
15. LESSOR'S PERFORMANCE OF LESSEE OBLIGATIONS* 
If Lessee shall fail to duly and promptly perform any of its obligations under this 
Agreement with respect to any vehicle, Lessor may (at its option) perform any act or make 
any payment which Lessor deems necessary for the maintenance and preservation of such 
vehicle and Lessor's title thereto, including payments for satisfaction of liens, repairs, 
taxes, levies and insurance and all sums so paid or incurred by Lessor, together with interest 
at the maximum rate permitted by law from the date of payment, and any reasonable legal 
fees incurred by Lessor in connection therewith shall be additional amounu due under this 
Agreement and payable by Lessee to Lessor on demand. The performance of any act or 
payment by Lessor as aforesaid shall not be deemed a waiver or release of any obligation or 
default on the part of Lessee. 
16. TAX INDEMNITY. 
This Section 16 applies unless otherwise specified in Exhibit "l". 
16.1 If (a) for any reason other than a Law Change (as hereinafter defined) Lessor is 
not entitled to claim or shall have reduced or disallowed all or any portion of the 
investment tax credit or the depreciation or ACR5 deductions described in 
Exhibit Hl" ("Tax Benefits") or any such Tax Benefits are recaptured or deferred 
in whole or in part pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code of 19*4, as amended (a 
"Tax Benefits Loss") or (b) there occurs a Law Change that would result in a 
reduction of Lessor's aiter-tax yield from the leasing of any vehicle hereunder (a 
"Law Change Loss"), then Lessee shall pay to Lessor as additional rent such 
amount as* after deduction of all taxes required to be paid by Lessor in respect 
of the receipt thertof under the laws of any governmental or taxing authority in 
the United States, shall be required to cause Lessor's net return and cash flow to 
equal the net return and cash flow that would have been available to Lessor if it 
(1) Lessor had been entitled to the utilization of the Tax Benefits or (ii) such Law 
Change had not occurred (in either casef the "Tax Indemnity Amount"). For 
purposes hereof, "Law Change" means any amendment of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954 that is enacted after the date on which the Overall Lease Term 
commences as to a particular vehicle. 
16.2 Lessor shall be responsible lor, and shall not be entitled to a payment "by Lessee 
on account of9 any Tax Benefits Loss arising solely as a direct result of the 
occurrence of any one or more of the following eventst (i) the failure of Lessor 
to timely and properly claim Tax Benefits (unless tax counsel to Lessor shall 
have advised it that such Tax Benefits cannot properly be claimed for any 
vehicle on the tax return of Lessor (or the consolidated Federal taxpayer group 
of which Lessor is a part); or (ii) the failure of Lessor (or the consolidated 
Federal taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) to have sufficient taxable 
income before depreciation or ACRS deductions with respect to the vehicles to 
offset the full amount of any such depreciation or ACRS deduction or to have 
sufficient tax liability to utilize the investment tax credit with respect to the 
vehicles. 
16.3 Lessor promptly shall notify Lessee in writing of any Tax Benefits Loss or Law 
Change Loss and of the Tax Indemnity Amount relating thereto and Lessee shall 
pay to Lessor such Tax Indemnity Amount within thirty (30) days of such notice. 
For purposes of this Section 16, a Tax Befietttr Loss shall occur upon the earliest 
of (i) the happening of any event (such as a change in use of any vehicle or a 
disposition of a vehicle by Lessor after Lessee has terminated the lease of such 
vehicle before the end of the Base Lease Term thereof) which may cause such 
Tax Benefits Loss; (ii) the payment by Lessor (or the consolidated Federal 
taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) to the Internal Revenue Service or a 
state or local taxing authority of the tax increase resulting from such Tax 
Benefits Loss; or (Ui) the adjustment of the tax return of Lessor (or the 
consolidated Federal taxpayer group of which Lessor is a part) by an examining 
agent to reflect such Tax Benefits Loss; for purposes hereof9 a Law Change Loss 
shall occur upon the effective date of such Law Change. 
16.4 Notwithstanding the foregoing, following the sale or other disposition of a 
vehicle by Lessor, if no Tax Benefits Loss has previously occurred with respect 
to such vehicle, a Tax Benefits Loss shall (unless Lessee shall have paid in full 
the Termination Value of such vehicle pursuant to Section 19) be deemed to have 
resulted and the Tax Indemnity Amount with respect thereto shall be that 
amount determined by multiplying the factor set forth on Exhibit HP by the 
Agreed Price* 
16.3 Lessee's obligations under this Section shall survive the termination of this 
Agreement. 
i 7. EVENTS OP DEFAULT. 
Lessee shall be in default under this Agreement with respect to all vehicles acquired 
hereunder upon the happening of any of the following events or conditions ("Events of 
Default"): 
17.1 Default by Lessee in payment of any Interim RentaU or Rental Payment or any 
other indebtedness or obligation now or hereafter owed by Lessee to Lessor 
under this Agreement or otherwise; 
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17.2 Default in the performance of any obligation, covenant or liability contained in 
this Agreement or any other agreement or document with Lessor, and the 
continuance of such default for ten (10) consecutive days after written notice 
thereof by Lessor to Lessee; 
17.3 Any warranty, representation or statement made or furnished to Lessor by or on 
behalf of Lessee or any permitted sublessee proves to have been false m any 
material respect when made or furnished; 
17.* Loss, theft, damage, or destruction of any vehicle not covered by insurance or 
the attempted sale or encumbrance by Lessee of any vehicle, or the making of 
any levy, seizure or attachment thereof or thereon; 
17.3 Dissolution, termination of existence, discontinuance of its business, insolvency, 
business failure, or appointment of a receiver of iny part of the property of, or 
assignment for the benefit of creditors by, Lessee or any permitted sublessee or 
the commencement of any proceedings under any insolvency, bankruptcy, 
reorganization or arrangement laws by or against Lessee or any permitted 
sublessee; or 
17.6 Lessee or any permitted sublessee shall fail generally to pay its debts as they 
become due, or shall take any corporate action in furtherance of any Event of 
Default. 
Anything to the contrary contained in the preceding provisions of this Section 17 
notwithstanding! in the event that the Lessor shall have assigned to one or more third 
parties all or any part of its right, title and interest hereunder, each such third party shall, 
to the extent of the rights assigned to it, have the right to determine whether the happening 
of any of the foregoing events or conditions (a) with respect to any Interim Rentals of 
Rental Payments or other payment not assigned to such third party, or (b) with respect to 
any of the Lessee's obligations, covenants, liabilities, representations and warranties 
regarding any vehicle, rights to which have not been assigned to such third party, shall 
constitute Events of Default for purposes of such third party's rights in and to trus 
Agreement. 
In the event of an affirmative election in writing by any such third party to treat an 
event or condition described in the preceding clause (a) or clause (b) as an Event of Default, 
for purposes of such third party's rights hereunder, such third party shall, to the extent of 
the rights assigned to it, be entitled to exercise the remedies provided for in Section 18. 
Absent such an affirmative election by such third party, (i) the rights assigned to such third 
party shall be deemed, for purposes of this Section 17, to arise under a separate lease 
agreement and (ii) there shall not be any cross-default between such deemed separate lease 
agreement and this Agreement. 
IS. REMEDIES OF LESSOR. 
Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default and at any time thereafter: 
1S.1 Lessor may without any further notice exercise one or more of the following 
remedies, as Lessor in its sole discretion shall elect: (a) declare all unpaid rentals 
under this Agreement (discounted, however, to their then present value at a 
discount rate of 6% per annum) to be immediately due and payable; (b) terminate 
this Agreement as to any or all vehicles! (c) take possession of the vehicles 
wherever found, and for this purpose enter upon any premises of Lessee or any 
other person and remove the vehicles, without liability for suit, action or other 
proceeding by the Lessee or any person acting by, for or under Lessee, and 
remove the same; (d) cause Lessee at its expense promptly to return the vehicles 
to Lessor in the condition set forth in Section 6.2; (e) use, hold, sell, repair, lease 
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or otherwise dispose of the vehicles on the premises of Lessee or any other 
location Without afftcting the obligations of Lessee as provided in this 
Agreement (f) sell or lease the vehicles at public auction or by private sale or 
lease at such time or times and upon such terms as Lessor may determine, free 
and clear of any rights of Lessee and, if notice thereof is required by law, any 
notice in writing of any such sale or lease by Lessor to Lessee not less than ten 
(10) days prior to the date thereof shall constitute reasonable notice thereof to 
Lessee; (g) proceed by appropriate action either at law or in equity to enforce 
performance by Lessee of the applicable covenants of this Agreement or to 
recover damages for the breach thereof; and (h) exercise any and all rights 
accruing to a lessor under any applicable law upon a default by a lessee. 
18.2 In addition. Lessor shall be entitled to recover immediately as liquidated 
damages, and not as a penalty, a sum equal to the aggregate of the following: (a) 
all unpaid rentals or other sums which are due and payable hereunder up to the 
date of redelivery to, or repossession by, Lessor; (b) any expenses paid or 
incurred by Lessor in connection with exercising any of its remedies under 
Section IS*I, including attorneys1 feest legal expenses and court costs; (c) ail 
unpaid rentals due and to become due under this Agreement for any vehicle 
which Lessee fails to return to Lessor as provided above or converts or destroys, 
or which Lessor is unable to repossess; (d) the Tax Indemnity Amount (if Section 
16 applies)} and (e) an amount equal to the difference between (i) all unpaid 
rentals for any vehicle returned to or repossessed by Lessor from the date 
thereof to the end of the term therefor plus the expected Termination Value (if 
any) of such vehicle at the end of the term therefor, and (ii) the wholesale value 
of each such vehicle on such date, provided* however, that the value of each 
vehicle shall not exceed the proceeds of any sale thereof by Lessor. Should 
Lessor, however, estimate its actual damages to exceed the foregoing, Lessor 
may, at its option, recover its actual damages in-lieu thereof or in addition 
thereto* Lessor shall not be obligated to sell, lease br otherwise dispose of any 
vehicle hereunder if it would impair the sale, lease or other disposition of other 
vehicles in the ordinary course of Lessor's business or vehicles which were 
previously repossessed by Lessor from any party. 
15.3 None of the remedies under this Agreement are intended to be exclusive, but 
each shall be cumulative and in addition to any other remedy referred to herein 
or otherwise available to Lessor at law or in equity and the third party election 
set forth in the penultimate paragraph of Section 17 shall be exercisable so long 
as the Events and Default described in clause (a) or (b) of said paragraph are 
continuing. Any repossession or subsequent sale or lease by Lessor of any vehicle 
shall not bar an action for a deficiency as herein provided, and the bringing of an 
action or the entry of judgment against the Lessee shall not bar the Lessor's 
right to repoesess any or ail vehicles. LESSEE WAIVES ANY AND ALL RIGHTS 
TO NOTICE AND TO A JUDICIAL HEARING WITH RESPECT TO THE 
REPOSSESSION OF THE VEHICLES BY LESSOR IN THE EVENT OF A DEFAULT 
HEREUNDER BY LESSEE. 
19. TERMINATION. 
At the end of the Base Lease Term of any vehicle or upon the termination of the lease 
pursuant to Section It hereof by Lessor, or upon the exercise by Lessee of its right to retire 
any vehicle from service pursuant to Section 3.3, Lessee will return such vehicle to Lessor 
at the location specified in Section 3.3. Lessor will sell it at wholesale in a commercially 
reasonable manner. If the net selling price is more than the amount (the "Termination 
ValueM with respect to such vehicle) determined by applying the formula set forth in Exhibit 
•11-
T (if a formula lor such determination appears therein or by multiplying the factor set 
forth in Exhibit T by the Agreed Price, (if a table of factors for such determination appears 
therein)* Lessor will p4y Lessee the surplus less any amounts owed under this Agreement. If 
it is less* Lessee will pay. the deficiency plus any amounts owed under this Agreement, The 
net selling price is the sale price less the sum of (a) Lessor's direct expenses of selling, 
preparing and storing such vehicle and (b) the Settlement Fee shown on Schedule "A". 
20. FURTHER ASSURANCES 
Lessee shall execute and deliver to Lessor, upon Lessor's request, such instruments, 
opinions of counsel, authorizing resolutions, financing statements and assurances as Lessor 
deems necessary for the confirmation or perfection of this Agreement and Lessor's rights 
hereunder. In furtherance thereof, Lessor may file or record this Agreement or financing 
statements with respect thereto so as to give notice to any interested parties. Any such 
filing or recording shall not be deemed evidence that this Agreement is intended as security 
or of any intent to create a security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code. Lessee 
authorizes Lessor and Lessor's assignee and each subsequent assignee to file a financing 
statement signed only by Lessor or such assignee in all places where such authorization is 
permitted by law. 
21. SEVERABILITY. 
Any provision of this Agreement that is prohibited or unenforceable in any jurisdiction 
shall, as to such jurisdiction, be ineffective to the extent of such prohibition and 
unenforceability without invalidating the remaining provision hereof. To the extent 
permitted by applicable law, Lessee hereby waives any provision of law which prohibits or 
renders unenforceable any provisions hereof in any respect. 
22. NOTICES. 
All notices, reports and other documents provided for herein shall be deemed to have 
been given or made when mailed, postage prepaid, or delivered to a telegraph or cable 
company, addressed to Lessor or Lessee at their respective addresses set forth above or such 
other addresses as either of the parties hereto may designate in writing to the other from 
time to time for such purpose. 
23. AMENDMENTS AND WAIVERS. 
This Agreement, the Accounting Forms, Purchase Orders and Schedules executed by 
Lessor and Lessee constitute the entire agreement between Lessor and Lessee with respect 
to the vehicles and the subject matter of this Agreement. No term or provision of this 
Agreement, the Accounting Forms, Purchase Orders and Schedules may be changed, waived, 
amended or terminated except by a written agreement signed by both Lessor and Lessee, 
except that Lessor may insert the serial number of any vehicle or other identifying 
information on the appropriate documents after delivery of such vehicle, No express or 
implied waiver by Lessor of any Event of Default hereunder shall in any way be, or be 
construed to bet * waiver of any future or subsequent Event of Default, whether similar in 
kind or otherwise/ 
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2k. CHOICE OF LAW; CONSTRUCTION. 
THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE BINDING, WHEN ACCEPTED BY LESSOR IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH Off PENNSYLVANIA, AND SHALL BE CONSTRUED AND ENFORCED 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
PENNSYLVANIA. LESSEE CONSENTS TO THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
OVER LESSEE BY ANY COURT OF RECORD SITTING IN PENNSYLVANIA IN 
CONNECTION WITH ANY ACTION ARISING OUT OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND WAIVES 
ALL OBJECTIONS TO VENUE IN ANY SUCH COURT AND TO SERVICE OF PROCESS ON 
LESSEE AT ITS DESIGNATED ADDRESS FOR PURPOSES OF NOTICE HEREUNDER IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PENNSYLVANIA UNIFORM INTERSTATE ANO 
INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT OR ANY SUCCESSOR STATUTE IN CONNECTION 
WITH SUCH ACTION. Lessee waives, insofar as permitted by law, trial by jury and right of 
counterclaim in any action between the parties. The titles of the sections of this 
Agreement are for convenience only and shall not define or limit any of the terms or 
provisions hereof. Time is of the essence of this Agreement in each and ail of its provisions. 
25. PARTIES. 
The provisions of this Agreement shall be binding upon, and inure to the benefit of, the 
permitted assigns, representatives and successors of the Lessor and Lessee. If there is more 
than one Lessee named in this Agreement, the liability of each shall be joint and several. 
26. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. 
Lessee will furnish Lessor (a) within k5 days of the dose of each fiscal quarter of 
Lessee a balance sheet and profit and loss statement of Lessee as of the ^mi of such quarter, 
(b) within 90 days after the close of each fiscal year of Lessee, a balance sheet and profit 
and loss statement of lessee as of the end of such year, the yearly statement to be certified 
by public accountants of recognized standing acceptable to Lessor, (c) such other financial 
statements and information to be furnished promptly after the same is made available to 
said stockholders, and (d) such other information respecting the financial condition and 
operations of Lessee as Lessor may from time to time reasonably respect. 
27. CONFESSION OP JUDGMENT. 
UPON OEFAULT LESSEE HEREBY EMPOWERS THE PROTHONOTARY OR ANY 
ATTORNEY OF ANY COURT OF RECORD WITHIN THE UNITED STATES OR ELSEWHERE 
TO APPEAR FOR IT AND, WITH OR WITHOUT ONE OR MORE DECLARATIONS FILED, 
CONFESS A JUDGMENT OR JUDGMENTS AGAINST IT IN THE FAVOR OF LESSOR OR 
ANY ASSIGNEE AS OF ANY TERM FOR THE UNPAID BALANCE HEREOF WITH COSTS 
OF SUIT AND AN ATTORNEY'S COMMISSION OF 10% FOR COLLECTION, WITH 
RELEASE OF ALL ERRORS AND WITHOUT STAY OF EXECUTION, AND INQUISITION 
AND EXTENSION UPON ANY LEVY ON REAL ESTATE IS HEREBY WAIVED AND 
CONDEMNATION AGREED TO, ANO THE EXEMPTION OF ALL PROPERTY FROM LEVY 
AND SALE ON ANY EXECUTION THEREON, AND EXEMPTION OF WAGES FROM 
ATTACHMENT, ARE ALSO HEREBY EXPRESSLY WAIVED, ANO NO BENEFIT 
EXEMPTION SHALL BE CLAIMED UNDER OR BY VIRTUE OF ANY EXEMPTION LAW 
NOW IN FORCE OR WHICH MAY HEREAFTER BE ENACTED. 
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IT IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT 
PROVISIONS HEREIN CONTAINED AFFECT AND WAIVE CERTAIN LEGAL RIGHTS OF 
LESSEE AND HAVE BEEN READ, UNDERSTOOD AND VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO ay 
LESSEE. 
LESSEE HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF AN EXECUTED AND TRUE COPY 
OF THIS LEASE. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, th« Lessor and Lessee, intending to be legally bound, have 




Accepted by Lessor this A\J^£^^^^ CP^( 
Pittsburgh, PA 1323*. 
RICAN 
HAL CAR RENTAL 
<„J~r 
*i/*/*? *^ZZ. > -^f., . . j , 
at 121 Freeport Road, 
TERMINAL RENTAL ADJUSTMENT CLAUSE 
LRX. 1O0X13) Statement 
The undersigned hereby certifies, under penalty of perjury, that it intends that more 
than 30 percent of the use of the vehicles subject to the above Agreement will be in the 
undersigned^ trade or business. 
The und€f%ign^ has further been advised that it will not be treated as the owner of 
the vehicles subject to the Agreement for federal income tax purposes and the undersigned 
is not aware of any information which may lead Lessor to believe that this certification is 
false. iHt% 
MCQMjA/AlffiRICAN 
LESSEE*IN?TOWrfy5NAL CAR RENTAL 
Date: /- ^ r 
- U -
SCHIDULE "A" 
TO PREFERRED VEHICLE LEASE AGREEMENT 
NON-TAX ORIEHTED 
1. ACQUISITION FEE 
$75,00 
2. SETTLEMENT FEE 
$75.00 par vehicle on vehicles sold by LMV on behalf of MCO, Inc-
DBA/American International Car Rental. 
3. APPORTIONMENT OF EXCESS OF SALES OR SETTLEMENT PRICE IN EXCESS OF BOOK 
VALUE AFTER DEDUCTION OF SETTLEMENT FEE. 
Lessor shall pay to Lessee as a rental adjustment 100% of any such 
excess. If the amount remain ins results in a deficiency, Lessee shall 
pay to Lessor as rental adjustment the amount of such deficiency, 
provided that Lessor shall guarantee to Lessee minimum net resals 
proceeds equal to 201 of the Agreed Price at the beginning of the initial 
lease term. If Lessse is otherwise permitted to and does elect to extend 
the lease of any vehicle beyond the Base Lease Term, Lessor shall 
guarantse 25X of the fair value of the vehicle at the inception of the 
extension period. 
"Fair value'1 shall be defined as 851 of resale value for 
automobiles, and 70X of resale value on light trucks A9 reported by 
"Automotive Market Report" published by Automotive Auction Publishing, 
Inc., as of the publication date immediately preceding the last day of 
the month which lamed lately precedes the month in vhlch termination %B to 
the particular vehicle occurs. 
Settlements of excess or deficiency from ressls, as dsscrlbed 
above, shall be based on calendar-year-to-date tales. Tentative 
settlements vlll be made monthly, but adjusted quarterly, to year-to-date 
results. For this purpose, e quarter is defined as a three-month period 
ending March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31. 
4. FINANCING CHARGE 
Financing charges shall be charged at an Interest rate of tvo 
parses* (21) in excess of the prime rate. The prime rate shall be that 
rate chaYgad by Citibank, New York. This rate vlll be changed every month 
by reference to the prime rate as reported by Citibank, Nev York on the 
15th calendar day of the applicable lease period. 
5. ADMINISTRATIVE FEE 
•0011 of the Agreed Price per month per vehicle. After forty-eight 
months, the edmlnistrstive fee shall be 201 of the Monthly Rental Payment 
per month per vehicle. 
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6.AGREED PRICE 
$100.00 over Dealer Invoice. This pricing applies only to ordered 
vehicles customarily used by corporate fleets which are manufactured by 
Bulck, Chevrolet, Chrysler, Dodge, Ford, Mercury, Oldsmobile, Plymouth, 
Pontiac and Chevrolet, Dodge and Ford Trucks having a GVW of 11,000 
pounds or under. This pricing is premised on continuation of the vehicle 
manufacturers' existing pricing structure and dealer incentive programs 
for the sale of motor vehicles to its dealers for 1987 models. In the 
event the pricing structure or dealer Incentive is changed by any of the 
manufacturers for 1987 or subsequent models, then the pricing agreed to 
herein shall be null and void with respect to that manufacturer's vehicle 
and the parties hereto agree to negotiate revised pricing* 
If a motor vehicle is taken from the existing inventory of a dealer 
or is ordered by LMV from a dealer specified by Lessee, LMV shall be 
entitled to a fee of 2% over procurement cost. 
7. METHOD OF COMPUTATION FOR RENTAL PAYMENTS 
Each Monthly Rental Payment shall be equal tot 
I. The Agreed Price lass the balloon Payment of each vehicle divided 
by the Base Lease Term as set forth in the Accounting Form. 
PLUS 
II. The financing amount determined by multiplying the financing charge 
by the preceding month's book value. 
8. INSURANCE 
In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 11 of this 
Agreement, Lessee is to provide Insurance as followsi 
Comprehensive, fire, theft and collision Insurance for the actual 
cast value of the equipment. Lessee shall be responsible for any 
deductible provision applicable to this insurance. Lessee shall also 
provide public liability Insurance with minimum limits of $250,000 per 
parson and $500,000 per accident for bodily Injury and $250,000 for 
property* or a combined single limit in the amount of $500,000. LMV 
Leasing, Inc. shall be named as additional insured and Lost Payee. 
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LEASE TESM8 II MOUTHS 
forty-sight (48) months* The minima lssss tsm of any pises of 
equipment lssss hsrsondsr is twelve (12) months. Unlets Lsssor otherwise 
consents, the lesse with respect to sny pisce of equipment msy not be 
terminated by Lessee prior to the end of the tvelfth (12th) month of the 
Bass Lease Term thereof. In the event that Lessor so consents and the 
lease is so terminated by Lessee, Lessee agrees that Lessor shsll be 
entitled, in addition to the amount specified in Exhibit "I" hereto, to 
reasonable administrative charges associated with such termination 
including any residual value of the vehicle and any penalties and charges 




Should any equipment leased hereunder be terminated or replaced 
prior to the end of the Base Lease Term for the purpoeee (directly or 
indirectly) of refinancing, Lessee agrees to pay to Lessor all costs and 
penalties associated with such premature termination or replacement, 
including, without limitation, any and all penalties of financial 
institutions, rsasonable administrates charges of Lessor to effect such 
premature termination or replacement and any loss of anticipated tax 
benefits to Lsssor as specified in this Agreement* 
Upon occurrence of a default by Lessee, or guarantor(s), if any, A§ 
provided for under this Agreement or under the terms of any other 
agreement of lease entered into between Lessee and Lessor that has been 
guaranteed by guarantor(s), if sny, Lessor at its option shsll havs and 
may exercise, with respect to this Agreement or any other agreement or 
lease, any and all rights and remedies available to Lessor under the 
terms of this Agreement or any other agreement or under the terms of 
this Agreement or any other agreement or lease, at lav or in equity. 
Except ae otherwise provided in paragraph 17 of this Agreement, a 
default under the. terms of amy lease or agreement is, at Lessor's option, 
a default under all leases or agreements between Lessor and Lessee and/or 
guarantor, if any. 
BR0KE1 
Lessee represents and warrants that it has not retained a finder or 
a broker in connection with this Lsase or the transactions contemplated 
by this~-Le*ee. Lessor represents and warrants that it has not retained a 
finder or a broker in connection with this Lease or the transactions 
contemplated hereby other than Rental Car Leasing and Services Inc., 
whose fee mill be paid by Lessor alone. Lessee acknowledges that nslthsr 
Rental Car Leasing and Services Inc., nor its employees or 
repreeentatlvee are the employee, agent or representative of Lessor for 
any purposes whatsoever and has not and cannot make any representation, 
statements, promises, claims or contract modifications of any kind or ths 
like on behalf of Lessor. 
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CONTINUATION Of ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS 
13. Add a nev section "2.4t Lessee represents end varrants (e) thet 
this Leese constitutes, end eech Schedule end attachment vhen executed 
will constitute, e duly authorized end velid obligation of Lessee, 
enforceable egeinst Lessee in accordance with the terms thereof, (b) thet 
neither the execution by Lessee of this Lease and each Schedule nor its 
performance thereof will result in any breach of, or constitute e default 
under or a violation of Lessee's certificate of incorporation, Lessee's 
by-lavs or any other governing instrument of Lessee, any lav, rule, or 
regulation or any agreement, order or judgement, (c) thet Lessee is in 
good standing in its state of incorporation art1 other form of organization 
and is entitled to own properties and to carry on business in eech state 
where any vehicle is to be located, (d) that no consent, t ling or other 
action by or with any governmental agency or other regulatory body is 
necessary for the acquisition and operation of the vehicles as 
contemplated by this Lease, (e) that there is no litigation pending or 
threatened against its obligations hereunder And (f) that all financial 
statements furnished by Lessee to Lessor fairly present the financial 
condition and results of operations of Lessee as of the respective dates 
and for the respective periods covered end do not contain any untrue 
statement, or any omission, of a material fact, and that since the date 
of the most recent of such financial statements, there has occurred no 
material adverse change in the business or condition of Lessee. Lessee's 
execution of each Schedule shall constitute a reaffirmation of these 
representations and warranties. Lessee shall provide Lessor an opinion 
of counsel, acceptable to Lessor end lte counsel, that items 2.4(e) 
through (e) are correct ae represented. 
14. On page 7, paragraph 12. GENERAL INDEMMITT Insert on line 3 after 
"in part19 the follovingt "arising out of activities permitted hereunder 
and/or (b) related". 
15. Modifications for paragraph 10.2 and 13.1. "The above paragraphs 
notvithstending, Lessee may rent vehicles provided under this Leese for 
periods of time, not to exceed the term of the vehicle under this Lease, 
to licensed drivers over 21 years of ege and otherwise qualifying 
hereunder. This right to rent is expressly limited to rentals in the 
normal course of Lessee's business under restrictions contained in the 
Exhibit "A" - MCO, Inc. Standard Form Agreement. 
16. Add to paragraph 17.6 et the end, after "defaults" the following 
as part of the last sentence, "Lessee shall fa J. to rent any vehicle in 
accordance with the terms of Exhibit "A" or eny restrictions of this 
Lease." 
17. DEPOSIT. Lessor has the right to demand Leeeee make end maintain a 
deposit with Lessor equal to the last preceding monthly rentel et eny 
given point in time. Failure by Leeeee to maintain such a deposit amount 
with Lessor, upon Lessor's demand, shall be a breach of thle Agreement by 
Leeeee end shall constitute a full Event of Default vlth all the 
consequences thereof. 
THIS SCHEDULE "A" IS AM ADDEHDOM TO THE ABOVE REFERENCED PREFERRED VEHICLE 
LEASE AGREEMENT WITH CAPITALIZED TEEMS USED IN THIS ADDENDUM AMD MOT OTHERWISE 
DEFIMED HESEDI HAVIHC THE RESPECTIVE MEAMIKGS AS SPECIFIED IM THE AGREEMENT. 
THIS SCHEDULE IS INCORPORATED INTO AMD CONSTITUTES AM INTEGRAL PART OF THE 
ABOVE REFERENCED AGREEMENT. 
This Schedule "A" is part of the Preferred Vehicle Lease 
Agreement dated December 29, 1986 betveea the parties and is 
hereby made a part thereof. 
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Title 
PAL CAR RENTAL, LESSEE 
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DKCONDITIONAL AND IIIlfOCAlLl 
CUAKAWTT OF FATMtKT 
In coosldtrsti 
othar good and valua 
•ufflciancy of which 
putpoaa of aaaklog t 
aotar into a laaalof 
MCO, INC. 
oo of tha auw of Tan Dollars ($10*00) aad 
bio consldaratlona, tha racalpt and 
la hereby ackoovledgadf and for tha 
o induct LMT Leaalng, Inc. ("Laiaor") to 
arraagawent with 
DBA/AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAT, 
(•Lessee*), tha Undersigned, jolotly and severally If aort than 
ooi, doaa haraby irrevocably and unconditionally guarantee to 
Lessor, and to ita traoeferees, auecaaaora» and aaalgna tha 
prompt paywant and perforwence of all euwe and othar 
obligttiooi which ara dut or haraaftar way bacowa dua and tha 
parforwaoca and obearvanca by Laaaaa of all of tha terwe, 
conditions (Including thoaa partalolng to loauranca liability), 
stipulations and agraawanta pursuant to that cartaln laasa 
agreewent batwaan Ltssor and Leesee datad December 29
 t 198J 
C L a a a a * ) , Including any and all renewals
 9 wodlfleatloos, 
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a and L 
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, course of dealing, delay, or owleelon on the part 
exercising or enforcing any of lta rights or 
ar tba Laaaa or under thla lnatruwant executed In 
1th tha Laaaa (Including tha ralaaaa of any 
tha Laaaa) shall Iwpalr or ba prejudicial to tha 
awadlaa of Laaaor hereunder and tha anforcewent 
aor way axtaod, wodlfy, or poatpona tha tlwa and 
ywaot and parforwaoca of tha tarws, conditions, 
and agraawanta of tha Laaaa and any othar docuwant 
t In connection therewith, all without notlca to or 
ha Underalgned. Laaaor way enforce tha provlalons 
tlwa to tlwa aa often aa tha occasion therefore way 
aaaor aball not ba required to flrat Initiate, 
arclaa any of lta rlghta or rawadlaa agalnat any 
or party primarily or secondarily liable under tha 
Tha Undersigned agreei 
governed by thw lawa of tha 
Dndaralgnad haraby consente 
of tha Stata of Fenneylvanii 
t ahall be 
a and tha 
of tha courta 
herein* 
II VITlIgg WHIIIOF, tl 
delivered fhla lnetruwent ut 
jr/fM nt 7 . 
Signed, aa 





UNCOHDITIONAL AKO U l I V O C A l l E 
COAIANTT OF FATHEWT 
In coosldtrtt loo of tht sua of Tea 0 
ochtr good tad welutblt considtrttloot f th 
tufficitncy of which li htrtby tckoowltdgt 
purpose of seeking to Induct LMT Ltttlng, 
totir into t lotting trrtngtatat with _____________ 
MCO, INC. DBA /AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CAR RENTAL 
oiltrt ($10.00) tad 
o rtctlpt tod 
d, and for th* 
Inc. ("lessor") to 
("Lessee"), tht Uaderslgoed, Jointly sod s 
oot, dott hereby lrretoctbly tad uacoodlti 
Ltssor, tod to Itt trtotftrttt 9 tuectttort 
proapt ptyatot tnd ptrforatnet of til tuaa 
obligttlooa which trt dut or htrttfttr aty 
ptrforatoct tad obatrttoca by Lttttt of tl 
conditions (including thott ptrttining to 
ttlpulttioot tnd tgrttatatt pursutat to th 
tgrttatot bttwtta Ltssor tad Lttttt dtttd 
C l a a a a " ) , including toy tad til rtatwtlt, 
tatndatntt or txttntloot, la whole or la p 
rtsptct thtrtto. 
attrtlly If aort thto 
ootlly gutrtnttt to 
» tnd tsslgns tht 
tod othtr 
btcoat dut tod tht 
1 of tht terat, 
lasurtact liability) , 
at etrttia ltttt 
December 29
 t lfg6 
aodlf lettloati 
trt, atdt with 
Ho tet» courtt of dttliag, deity, or oaission oa tht pttt 
of Ltttor la exercising or enforcing tay of Itt rightt or 
rtatdltt uodtr tht Ltttt or under thlt iostruaent executed la 
eooatetloa with tht Ltttt (including tht rtltttt of soy 
gutrtntor of tht Ltttt) shtll iaptir or ba prtjudlcltl to tha 
rightt tad rtatdltt of Ltttor htrtuodtr tod tha tnforctatot 
htrtof. Ltttor aty extend, aodify, or pottpoot tht tlat tnd 
atnntr of ptyatnt tad ptrforataea of tht terat, conditions, 
ttlpulttioot tad tgrttatatt of tha Ltttt tod toy othtr docuatnt 
or lottruaaat la eoaatctioo thtrtvlth, til without ootict to or 
coostnt by tht Undtrsigntd. Ltttor aty taforet tht provisions 
htrtof froa tlaa to tlaa tt oftta tt tht oecttioo thtrtfort aty 
rtrltt tad Ltttor shtll aot ba reqolrtd to flrtt initlttt, 
purtut or txtrclst tay of Itt rightt or rtatdltt tgtlatt tay 
othtr ptrtoo or ptrty priatrlly or stcoodtrily lltblt under tha 
Ltttt* 
Tht Undtrsigntd tgrttt thtt thlt lnttruatnt shtll bt 
gowarotd by tha Itwt of tha Sttta of Ptootylwtolt tnd tht 
Undtrsigntd htrtby coottatt to tha Juritdictioo of tha eourts 
of tht Staca of Ptoatylttnlt tad to balog sutd thtrtla. 
IB VITMttS wailtOP, tht Undtrsigntd bss tiecuCtd snd 
dtlivtrtd thlt lattruatat uodtr tttl thlt //*£? dty of 
Signtd, setltd tnd dtllvtrtd 
in the presence of 
^#£ 
2LM$L &LuM~ 
LI\fV LEASING, IMC. 
A XEROX FINANCIAL SERVICES CO>>'PA\r 
Notice of Sale 
(This Notice is for informational 
purposes only as to MCO, Inc., 
which is currently in a Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Proceeding) 
To: MCO, Inc., d/b/a/American 
International Rent-A-Car 
1380 North West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Mr. Roy W. Mallory 
2980 Apache Way 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Mr. and Mrs. Val Conhn 
2214 Temple View Circle 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Mr. and Mrs. Tubber T. Okuda 
1994 South 1175 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Pursuant to Section 18 of the Preferred Vehicle Lease Agreement ("Lease") 
entered into between LMV LEASING, INC. ("Lessor") and MCO, Inc., d/b/a American 
International Car Rental on December 29, 1986, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that 
based the Lessee's default under the Lease, the Lessor will sell, as provided herein, 
the vehicles listed on Schedule "A", attached hereto, with the proceeds from such 
sale to be applied first to the costs of preparing the vehicles for sale, costs of sale, 
and storage fees with any remaining proceeds to be credited toward the amount 
owing Lessor by Lessee based on Lessee's default under the Lease. 
Said vehicles will be sold after April 13, 1988, for the highest and best price in an 
"AS IS" condition. Said vehicles are currently and will continue to be located, at the 
time of said sale, at Nate Wade Subaru, 1207 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and will be sold in the same manner and fashion as other used vehicles located at 
Nate Wade Subaru. 
DATED this 4th day of April , 1988. 
LMV LEASING, INC 
By 
tdward I. Mccracken 
Title Contoller 
